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A. FULL

DETAILED HIS TOBY

SIEGf OF VICKSBURG,

:B"5T .A., S. ABRAMS,

OF NEW ORLEANS.

Entered according to act of Congress, iu the year lv

BY A. S. ABRAMS,

llie Clerk's Office of the District Court, of the Confederate States for
the Northern District of Geoigia

^l FULL

,^D

I) E T A J L E I) H I S T O R Y

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG,

FST J±m 3. abra:

ATLANTA, GEORGIA :

ELLIGE8TCER STEAM POTVEK PEI

1863.

■ Pi

'TO

MAJOR GENERAL WM. LORING.

Cljts jlistorg is najptMjj $ri)irdte&,

IX HUMBLE' APPRECIATION OF

HIS SKILL AS AN OFFIOEE,

$l)e 3lutl)oi\

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Soon after my arrival from Vicksburg, where I was I
contributed two articles to the ''Advertiser and Register," of Mobile,
Alabama, under the signature of tv One . of tub Gaurison." One of
these articles was an account of the Battle of Baker's Creek and Big
Black, and the other a condensed account of the Siege of Vicksbur*-
The statements made in these two articles were from my own personal
observation, and information received from sources of undoubted ve-
racity.

The appearance of my two articles became the theme of Crit
by the press. Some of which were favorable, but others bitterly de-
nounced the author as having acted through a feeling of prejudice
against General Pemberton. Aware, as I am, tint none iu the Confede-
racy acted in a more cordial manner towards that General's control of
the Army of Vicksburg than I did, I did not notice the many denuncia-
tory remarks made, at the time, but compiled the work presented for the
purpose of showing, that instead of being as censorious as the case al-
lowed, I had kept silent in many things, which, had they been made
public, would have raised a clamor against General Pemberton of a far
more violent nature than what was hurled at him.

The author claims the right of knowing as much about the sieire 61
Vicksburg as any one residing in that town, from the fact that he
that point, in Company A, Withers' Light Artillery, as a private, when
the first gun was fired in its defense, and served as such until the raising
of the first siege. In September, 1862; he was discharged from the army
on account of sickness, and bein j unable to return to his home, (New
Orleans) obtained a position in the office of the ''Vicksburg Whig," where
he remained until its destruction by lire in the early part of May, ISGO,
and was taken prisoner and paroled after the surrender.

All the statements made in this work were either the result of the As.
thor's observation, or obtained from parties whose standing in the Army
warrants the Author in sa}-ing that the statements are beyond dispute,
and, did not military law prevent it, the names of many prominent offi-
cers could be called in corroboration of all that is written in this woik^
My remarks are not only my own opinions, but the conclusions to which
nine-tenths of the officers comprising the garrison of Vicksburg arrived

* * ,*-w ^„ ^~

4 rj^EFACE.

at some time before the attack en Grand Gulf, and verified by the results
following.

All that has been said or written, in defense of Gen. Pemberton's cam-
paign, is fairly laid before the public, at the same time the Anther brings
forward all the evidence possible to prove that the defense is not one to
which any credence can be attached. He, however, leaves it to the judg-
ment of the reader, whether the defense made is sufficiently strong re?
falsify his assertions.

In conclusion the Author would say, that although aware of the
criticisms that a work of this nature will be subject to, he gives it to
the public without fearing the censure of any. To those not ink
in defending Gen. Pemberton from the errors he committed during the
campaign, the work presented to the public will be recognized as, if a
severe, at least a just account of all that transpired in Mississippi; and to
those who arc inter caUd in defending Gen. Pemberton, as soon as the cen-
sure of this work is made public, the Author flatters himself of his ability
to lay bare the 'inoUren tchkh pr&knpied the defense. Conscious that thk-
work has been written in the firm belief of its truth, favorable criticism
will be welcome ; trat the censure" and denunciations of the press will not
cause the least regret that he has given truths and facts to the public as-
they t

A. S, ABRAMfr

Atl i . . sgu, NoVfiMBim'i t%6fk

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

TARTER I.

THE FIRST SIEGE. ;:. -,:

On the ISth day of May, 1862, the advance divi Com-

modore Farragut's fleet, under Lieutenant Lee, United States
Xavy, arrived below Vicksbuf^, from Xew Orleans, and de-
manded the surrender of the city. (It may be proper to state,
that as soon as Xe\7 Orleans fell, the heights of Vicksburg
were fortiiied, it is said by advice of Gen. Beauregard.) The
demand was refused, and the Federal commander gave twenty-
four hours' notice for the women and children to quit the town.

In accordance with the notice, Major General, then Brigadier
General, M. L. Smith, commanding the defenses, ordered all
non-combatants to leave the town, and actively prepared \^>r
the enemy. At this time the garrison consisted of the follow-
ing regiments: the 26th, 27th,"28th, 00th, 31st and 4th Louisi-
ana infantry; the 1st re'giment and 8th battalion of Louisiana
heavy artillery ; 1st Tennessee heavy artillery ; 3d Mississippi
battalion of infantry; Withers' light artillery regiment often
line batteries, and Stark's regiment of cavalry.

On the 26th of May the first bombardment took j
was continued with little or no damage to tl . until the

departure of the fleet.

The enemy's land forces, under brigadier General Will
occupied the Louisiana shore, nearly opposite Warrenton, and
about twelve miles below Vicksburg, to the number of 0,000,
but attempted no demonstration against the city, being
there more as a corps of observation, than for the p
making an offensive movement.

It had been a matter of surprise to a great n
that Vicksburg was not then attacked by land, as from thi
bie nature of our defenses, and the small number of m
ing it, we could easily have been defeated in a pitched battle
and driven out; but General Butler lacked both the capacity
and force to attempt an enterprise of so bold a nature. Beside*
which. Memphis beirig in our possession thej

6 THE SIEGE OF VICKSEURG.

confronting Halleck with an army of tried veterans, any serious
attack on Vicksburg, if defeated, would have placed Butler in
New Orleans, and Halleck before Corinth, in a very dangerous
position, so that, taking all things into consideration, it is now
evident that the enemy was not then prepared to take Vicks-
"burg, and the bombardment was only to keep us on the qui
vive, and compel us to mass troops there; thus either weaken-
ing, or preventing reinforcements from going to, Beauregard,
so that Halleck would be enabled to overpower and destroy the
only barrier to his sweeping through Mississippi, Tennessee and
Alabama. That that was the plan, after events made evident.

The capture of New Orleans was an event less expected by
the enemy than by our people. The attack on the forts was
for the same purpose as the after bombardment of Vicksburg,
viz : to keep us on the alert, and prevent any troops from being
sent to Beauregard. The capture of New Orleans did them
more harm than good, and had we neglected to fortify Vicks-
burg, and held Memphis, the result would have been greatly in
our favor; for, by sending the 10,000 or 12,000 troops defend-
ing Vicksburg to Corinth, Beauregard would have been able to
assume the offensive and drive Halleck from Tennessee. But-
ler's force in Louisiana was scarcely more than enough to hold
the city of New Orleans ; therefore, no attempt of a serious
nature would have been made to penetrate the interior of the
State of Mississippi. But to resume our account of the first
siege.

On the 28th of June, 1802, the first serious assault was made
by the enemy on water. At about two o'clock on the morning
of that day, seven of the enemy's boats advanced in front of
the city, and attempted to pass the batteries. A terrific bom-
bardment ensued, but in consequence of our having only seven
guns mounted at that time, the attempt was successful, and the
fleet passed up.

Soon after the commencement of the siege, Major General
Earl Van Dorn was sent to Vicksburg, and placed in command
over Brigadier General M. L. Smith. His arrival was hailed
with joy by the people of Mississippi, as an advent of success
to our arms, Gen. Van Dorn having the reputation of being a
" fighting num." Soon after his arrival, the garrisen was re-
inforced by Major General Breckinridge's division, from Beau-
regard's army.

The bombardment progressed slowly until the 15th of July,
when the Confederate ram u Arkansas" successfully run the
gauntlet, through thirty of the enemy's gun and mortar boats.
"This feat, in pomt of daring, was the most brilliant and success-
ful of the war, and reflected great credit on Lieutenant Brown,
the commander. In referring to this boat, we cannot resist,
making a few observations on the folly of Gen. Van Dorn in
sending her to Baton Rouge, as, if she had been kept at Vieks-

THE SIEGE OF VKKSEUKG. J

burg, after the occupation of Port Hudson, she would have
been the means of keeping the river open between that place
and Vicksburg. Not a single Yankee transport would have
dared to pass our batteries, though fear of being captured or
destroyed by her, and those gunboats which had the temerity
to venture past, would have fallen an easy prey to her, aided as
she would have been by the gunboats Webb and Beatty. The
end of this famous ram was her destruction near Baton Rouge,
where she had gone for the purpose of co-operating with the
land forces under Van Dorn. Her machinery is said to have
been damaged on the trip, and she was blown up to prevent her
falling into the hands of the enemy.

At about seven o'clock on the morning of the same day that
the Arkansas ran past the Yankee fleet, five of their gun boats
came down and endeavored to cut the Arkansas from her moor-
ings under our batteries. The effort was unsuccessful, and they
were compelled to hasten down the river, two of their boats
having been severely damaged by our guns.

Nothing of interest transpired from that time until the 25th
of July, 1 8623 when the two fleets retired, having accomplished
nothing more than keeping eight or ten thousand men idle at
that point.

It was during this siege that the Confederate troops discov-
ered the comparative harmlessness of mortar shells. Heretofore
these missiles ^jiad been looked upon with great awe by our
army. The gunboat panic also died away at this time, it hav-
ing been found by long experience that they were not half so
formidable as fear had pictured them.

During this siege, which lasted six weeks, the entire number
of shells thrown from the enemy , were estimated at from

25,000 to 30,000. The casualties resulting from this large num-
ber were surprisingly small ; there being but twenty-two sol-
diers killed and wounded, and one female and a negro killed.
The female referred to was a most estimable lady named Mrs.
Gamble, who had won the esteem of all who knew her, by her
many amiable qualities, and among the soldiers was looked upon
with great respect and friendship^ for her constant and untiring
kindness to them.

It was during the first sieg f Vicksburg that the heroism
■ Southern women was fully illustrated. On the morning
tb of. June, when the enemy's fleet passed our batte-
ries, going up the river, and shells were falling thick as hail in
the streets of the city, crowds of ladies could have been seen
O.n the "Court Jjouser" "Sky Parlor," and other prominent
places in the city, gazing upon, as they termed it, the "magnifi-
cent scene."

• On the departure of the United States fleet from Vicksburg,
Gen. Breckinridge s division, together with the 4th Louisiana
regiment, < from Y

8 THE SIBGH OE VtCKSBUBO.

Thus ended the first siege of Vicksburg, in which nothing-
was gained by the Confederate forces to have warranted the
amount of consequence placed upon its successful defense. The
enemy never attempted any attack by land on it, and the de-
monstrations of the fleet, even had they been successful, would
have been of no avail without a corresponding success on th?
part of their land forces. It is true that the importance of the
position was as much magnified in the North as it was in the
South, and the failure to capture the city, made them as despon-
dent as it made us rejoice.

CHAPTER II.

INTERIM BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND SIEGE.

After the departure of the enemy's fleet, business
measure resumed its wonted activity. Port Hudson having
been occupied by the Confederate forces, had been fortified,
thus giving us control of the river from that point to Vicks-
burg ; trade revived with Red River, and steamboats regularly
arrived. It was at this time that the city should have been
placed in a position to sustain a protracted siege, as there was
always a sufficient supply of beeves in Texas ft* have' enabled
us to procure any number without difficulty ; corn was also in
abundance, and could have been bought cheap at that time.

Soon after the fatal battle of Corinth, Major Gen. Earl Van
Dorn was removed from command, and Major Gen. Pemberton
was placed in command of the Department of Mississippi and
East Louisiana, and in consequence of his being out-ranked by
both Gen. Van Dorn and Gen. Lovell, was soon after appointed
a Lieutenant General. With almost an unanimous voice, his ap- '
pointment to such a responsible position was the subject of re-
gret. It had been known that Gen. Pemberton was in favor of
evacuating all points held by our forces on the water, and had
actually recommended the destruction of the works in Charles-
ton harbor, and the evacuation of the city. It was, therefore,
a matter of great surprise, when it was announced that he was
appointed to command a place that, since the fall of Memphis,
had been universally acknowledged as one of the most impor-
tant positions in the Confederacy. -Gen. Pemberton was not a
man that had won a name for capacity during the wTar. He had
never been on a battle-field, and bore no reputation as a com-
mander. And here it was that the President made the only
grave error that has given cause to censure his administration.

Duriug the time that elapsed from the departure of the ene-
mv's fleet to the arrival of Lieutenant General Pemberton, sev-

TH2 SIE'',^ Of VtC&SBI

era! additional batteries had been erected above the town, and
«S£ J°rw n-Sd bfVhro™ «* f">°> Chickasaw Barer
f3-« i% l?°n "m Yazoo river, which point had also been
fortified, for the. purpose of preventing the enemy's boats iron,
ascending the river.

..The number of guns mounted at this time, alon<r the river
did not exceed eighteen, and of these not more thanfour or
were of large calibre.

On the .arrival of Lieutenant Genera! Pemberton, the people
anticipated that immediate steps would have been taken to pro
cure a number 01 the heaviest kind of guns, and that new bat-
teries would have been immediatelv erected. To their utter
astonishment the Lieutenant General remained in Jackson, and
except an occasional visit, appeared to forget that such a pi
existed as Vicksburg. Absolutely nothing was done for the
further defense of the city. Not' a single- additional gun was
mounted and nr« means whatever taken to strengt I • „,.si-

Uon, mit.l after the battle of Chickasaw Bayou, when the Lieu
General Appeared for a moment to awake from his lethargy "
A. %v?S ,reaso»ab:: . :■■!. while we held poss,

the river from Port Hudson to Vicksburg, that prompt .
sures jroifld -tare been taken to transport all the p?
possible f,.om j0 m , , j. |0 Vicks]) fc P ^

not the case. Boat after boat arrrived. and nothin-r could

nearlv"ainS"gal' ^ P**** ^"^ aU *« mri^d
nW™JS Tn "' ""-' Sovernment, but if the assertions of
•oT/J Pf 1a,''%me!,cmi be believed, suck Va« hot thee
tor a great dca. of it belonged to privac individuals, who had
■t transported on government boats for a brofit.

burg was forgotten m the thirst for speculation.

in : the month of December it Was announced through tl
Northern press that Mujor General McClernand was entrusted
ZSAtiEF?* ".^M^ssippl river, and althoogh the ■
people of Hississippi had become thoroughly disgusted with

W?ho wmi?managT!'-'nt ?,' th° **!»«£ many believed
JikLtoX #I°i!M a.vall'a!1'' Prompt measures would '

was not 'o3 ^H ',C H "'g '" ** ^'^ State of defense; bu
Genera TW I ^ L*Pathy WM evlnced b>' Lieut™

kWn t t in' a?'l-nQth,In- tt This &ct was well

kn«wn to the press of Vicksburg, but from fear of its
■M to he enemy nothing was said in condemnation

stance '" SU Tl °T twiwVwhe!1 s":ne ^graceful circu,
stance had occurred, the voice of censure would be heard. ; 1
as this was of rare occurrence, in this way the public ova
\ icksburg were led to bel eve that everything

^WoXed (° Vts tfonso- -Vone s"'

ten ! m ^ . brforo b"?' tbat ^"tenan
ton would neglect to perform those

10 TEE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

meanest private in the army. To the disgrace of the coun-
try be it known, that the work of throwing up fortifica-
tions, provisioning the city, and procuring a proper supply of
ammunition, was left solely to the superintendence of subordi-
nate officers.

We strive in vain to find one single act of Lieutenant General
Peniberton that can entitle him to praise. Everything that
comes before us wears an aspect of incompetency ; and from
the fact* before ii£ Ave are compelled to say, that hod a Lee, a
Beauregard, a Bragg, or a Johnston been appointed to defend
it, Vicksburg would never have fallen, as those Generals would
never have been guilty of the gross ignorance that character-
ized the movements of Lieutenant General Pemberton.

There are five things that occurred in the control of his de-
partment, for which we look in vain for some excuse, whereby
we can in some, measure remove the responsibility from General
Pemberton's shoulders. First. The cause of there not being
enough provisions to have lasted a siege of six months, stored
away in the city. Second. The neglect to reinforce Brigadier
General Bowen with sufficient troops to hold the enemy in
check until Johnston could arrive with reinforcements. Third.
The cause of our fortifications around Vicksburg not being
completed during the five months preceding the siege. Fourth.
The reason of the works being so defective, that the damage
done to them in the day, from the fire of the enemy, could not
be fully repaired by a large force of laborers in the night. Fifth.
The cause of our army remaining on the west of Big Black
river, while the enemy were marching, with their rear exposed,
towards Jackson, and the majority of our officers favored an
advance movement; and why it was that the advance was not
made when General Johnston ordered it. We look in vain for
some excuse to palliate these errors, and are compelled, however
reluctantly, to come to the conclusion, that it was through gross
neglect of duty that Vicksburg wTas not provisioned largely ;
that it was through mismanagement that Ave lost the battle of
Baker's Creek; that it Avas through incompetency that Bowen
Avas not reinforced ; that it Avas through a proper Avant of skill
and energy that the Avorks around the city Avere not comple-
ted before our army fell back into Vicksburg ; and that it Avas
through a Avant of generalship that the enemy Avas allowed to
march towards Jackson Avithout General Pemberton promptly
attacking him in the rear.

To every one of these errors, Ave find circumstances of so
glaring a character that nothing said will ever satisfy the peo-
ple that they were unavoidable. With respect to the provision-
ing of Vicksburg, we* must emphatically deny that, there Avas
any difficulty in provisioning it. Many of the planters volunta-
rily offered their crops to the gOA^ernment for a sniali price, or
free of charge. Among these are Col. Benson Blake, now in

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUBGi H

-.he Confederate Army, Col. Auter, Dr. P. H. Cook, and others,
all men of standing and respectability in the State; and a short
time before the investment, a committee of three planters arrived
in Vicksburg, with an offer from the planters of the Yazoo and
Deer Creek district-, to give the government all their crops
free of <-har(/e, if the officials at Vicksburg would haul it awav
These gentlemen, on arriving, wont from one quartermaster to
the other., and from one commissary to the other, but each of
the parties thus applied to. disclaimed beintr the proper one to
receive their offer, and stated that they were unable to inform
:1*e '- * <vho the proper person was. The committee

after using their best endeavors to find some one to deliver the
offer to, and seeing that the utmost indifference was manifested
],yt]" m they tendered their offer, whether it

wa** me disgusted and returned home.

With respect to the reinforcing of Bo wen at Grand Gulf, we
can only say that it was the almost uanimous opinion of' our
Generals that the buttle of Vicksburg blight to have been fought
there, and it is the general belief that had our entire armv been
massed at that point, we could have defeated Grant, and "driven
him into the river'.

battle of Baker's Creek, and the defect in our works
around Vicksburg, will be referred to in another portion of this
book.

APTER III.
EN FIRST AND SECOND SIEGE- t y tinued.)

During the period elapsing between the first and second sieo-e,
the city had assumed a busy appearance ; numerous stores were
opened, and business, in a great measure, resumed its wonted

activity.

The entire strengtv of our river batteries, at this time, did
not exceed twenty-three guns, mounted along a space of several
miles from near the Village of Warrentom to a place called
Mint Spring, above the city. This small number of guns was
madequate to prevent the passage of the enemy's boats, as was
afterwards proven by the safe running past of the Queen of the
TfcsA 1/idiaiaola, Mmuwch and Lancaster, and the passage of
the enemy's fleet of gunboats and transports, on the night of
the twenty-second of April. While acknowledging that the
number 01 guns was insufficient to prevent their passage entire-
ly, we insist that had a proper degree of vigilance been exer-
cised by the officers commanding our batteries, the enemy could
never have auceee< Lavino- at

12 '-THE SIEftE OF YICFLSBCKG.

least one-half of them destroyed ; but no vigilance was exer-
cised,— no discipline kept np among the officers ; it Was one
constant scene of merriment among those who were not devo-
tees to Bacchus, and one uninterrupted course of drunken brawls
among those that were. Any qnantity of officers, dressed up
in all the toggery of gold lace and brass buttons, could be seen
promenading the streets, and a civilian could scarcely enter a
private residence without finding three or four of these gentry
on a visit. So outrageous had this laxity of discipline become,
that the press of Vicksburg was at last compelled to call atten-
tion to it. The censuro had little or no effect, and the same
course was pursued.

On the commencement of the month of December, the move-
ments of the United States army plainly indicated that the
storm, which had been so long gathering, would soon burst
upon the devoted city, and the first intimation received was the
landing of Sherman's corps on the Yazoo, and which resulted
in the battles of the 28th, 20th and 30th of December, and
known as the battles of Chickasaw Bayou, an account of which
we will give in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLES OF CHICKASAW BAYOU.

Chickasaw Bayou is situated about three miles above Vioks-
burg, and is a low and swampy portion of the County of War-
ren, in Mississippi. When the Yazoo river rises and overflows
its banks, the water runs over that section of the county, and
forms the Bayou from whence its name is devired.

A long line of breastworks and rifle-pits had been built at
this place, extending in a zigzag line from our river batteries,
above Vicksburg, to the fortifications on the Yazoo river, near
Snyder's Bluff. The position was of great natural strength,
being largely intersected with creeks and swamps, and offered
great impediment to the advance of hostile forces.

On the morning of the 2Sth of December, the enemy having
landed commenced driving in our pickets, and threw forward a
body of infantry to throw a pontoon bridge across a creek that
lay between them and our works. The building of the pontoon
was stoutly resisted for some time, but artillery having been
brought to bear upon our men they were forced to retire, and
the enemy crossed over that night. Skirmishing lasted all day,
with few or np casualties to the Confederate forces.

On the morning of the 29th the enemy, in strong force, ad-

THE SIEOE OF YICKSBUEG. 13

vaneed on our works, with the intention of storming them —
They marched up with great regularity and firmness to the
charge, and as soon as they arrived within one hundred yards
from our works gave a cheer and rushed on. They were gal-
lantly met by our forces under Brigadier General, now Major
General, Stephen D. Lee, of South Carolina, composed of a
ide of Louisianians, and after a severe engagement repulsed
with great slaughter. Our army, a few days previous, had been
reinforced by General Stephenson, with a division composed of
Tennesseeans, Georgians and Alabamians, who aided greatly in
Ising the enemy. The nghtinor-of the 28th and 17th Lou-
was oi the most gallant character possible. Although
s the first one in which the 28th was engaged, and
they had been under lire, thev withstocxfseveral
ults ot the enemy, repulsing him each time, and hold-
Lion throughout the dav. The fighting of the 17th
I. Unaided, these gallant men, under
mimand pi the brave Richardson, defeated and put to
$ght three lull regiments of the enemy, led bv Brie Gen-nl
Blair of the United States annv. :? • ?^J

On the morning of the next 'day (the 30th) the enemv made
a desperate assault on our right win g, with a bodv of* picked
men, numbering, it is. estimated, from 8V000 to 10,000 They
advanced with courage, and made the attack with spirit Our
forces met them with equal gallantry, and very soon a desperate
struggle for mastery commenced. The enemy made desperate
efforts to storm our lines, but was resisted with sdeeess by our
forces, ihree times ho appeared upon the point of carrvin^
the works, and as many times, by dint of great exertion and
heroism, was driven back with heavy loss. The battle continu-
ed long_and desperate. Wherever the danger was greatest, the
gallant Lee could be seen urging on his men, and inspiring their
with fresh courage. At last, a flank movement was made bv
our xorces, sallying from the breastworks and attacking the
enemy on his Hank, routing him, and compel .. to leave

some lour hundred prisoners in our hands. This coup J, etat
put aw end to the battle, the enemy having been punished too
severely to attempt another assault. Soon after h t the

y S«nt in ajlag of truce, 'requesting | . to bury

tneir dead, I aaer cover of this, many of the pri, oners escaped
Our loss in these battles did not exceed one hundred an-
twenty m killed and wounded. Among our killed was Captain
Hamilton PauL Assistant Adjutant General, on Brig, General
b. V. Lee s stab. He was a young man of great promise, and
had gamed the esteem and friendship of all who knew him

lhe loss oi the enemy is roughly estimated at twenty-five
hundred killed and wounded, and about four hundred prisoners,
in the last day s battle we captured from

14 THE SIEGE OF VICSfBulEiG'.

the enemy, as well as all the small arms left by them in their
retreat.

After the battle of the 30th, no engagement of any magni-
tude took place ; the next night the enemy re-embarked in their
boats, and returned to Memphis.

CHAPTER Y.

RETURN OF THE ENEMY. ■

Yicksburg is situated on the Mississippi river, about five hun-
dred and thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico, and is built ou
a plateau of hills rising about two hundred feet above the water.
These hills slope gradually upwards from the banks of the river,
except in the upper portion of the city, where they rise precipi-
tously and form cliffs, towering over the banks of the river. —
Northward, above the city, are a tier of hills generally known
as the " Walnut Hills." The Mississippi river takes an abrupt
turn at this point, forming a peninsula of that portion of Lou-
isiana, opposite Vicksburg, for about two miles, when it makes
another abrupt angle. Nine miles above this second curve in
the river, the Yazoo empties itself. The rear of the city is a
succession of hills, and the general feature of the country is
broken and largely intersected with ravines. It is also greatly
cut up by bayous and creeks, formed by the rain and overflow
of the numerous springs which are to be found over the whole
country.

Below Yicksburg, at Warrenton, the country is low and
marshy for about six hundred yards from the banks of the river,
when it makes an abrupt rise, forming a line of almost moun-
tainous heights.

The country around Yicksburg is very fruitful. Large crops
i -: cotton were usually made, and at the time we are speaking
of, a very extensive crop of corn and other cereals had been
planted. A large quantity of corn and bacon fell into the hands
of the enemy on their march to Yicksburg ; so large, in fact,
that from Gen.' Grant's official report, the entire Yankee army
subsisted for eight days on what they found in the different
plantations around Yicksburg, and during the entire siege tneir
horses and mules used no other corn but that of the surround-
ing planters.

From the time the attack on our works on Chickasaw Bayou
was made, to the return of the enemy, but little or nothing was
done to strengthen our position. The fortifications in the rear
of the city were commenced", but progressed slowly. It was

THE SIEGE QV YIOKSBSBG. 15

not anticipated that they would be required, but to use the words
of a prominent officer there, were l> only thrown up to satisfy
the public." In another portion of this book we will make fur-
ther remarks on the line of defenses that encircled Vicksburg.

On the 22d of January, 1863, intelligence was received that
fifty gunboats and transports had pa>sed Greenville, coming
down, and the following day a large fleet laden with troops ar-
rived at the bend of the river above Vicksburg, known as
"Young's Point." As soon as the boats arrived, the enemy
landed on the Louisiana shore, at a place called " White's Plan-
tation," which in a few hours became dotted with tents. The
gigantic plan of cutting a canal through the lower end of the
peninsula was then put in motion, with what success we shall
hereafter relate. Xo demonstration was attempted against the
city, until the morning of the 1st of February, when the ram
Queen of the West ran past the batteries in open day] q I

CHAPTER VI.

RUNNING OF THE BATTERIES BY THE RAM QUEEN OF THE

WEST.

At about half past four o'clock on
February, a black smoke was observed moving slowly down the
river, and shortly after, one of the enemy's cotton-clad rams,
which was afterwards discovered to be the Queen of the West,
was seen turning the point above the city. Not a shot having
been fired at her, she slowly continued her course, and had
almost got out of range of the water batteries above the city,
known as the " Mint Spring battery," before a gun was tired.
Just as she was on the point of going round the bend, the
guard gave the alarm, and the water battery opened on her.
Only a lew rounds were fired, when she steamed across the river,
and hugged the Mississippi shore, thus getting out of range of
the water battery. From the great height of the hill batteries,
the guns could not be depressed sufficiently to bear upon the
ram, until she had gone some distance. At that time no guns
had been mounted in front of the city, so that she continued
her course without receiving any material damage, until she had
arrived opposite where the hull of the steamer " Vicksburg"
lay, when, reversing her engines, she made a dash at the boat
with the intention of sinking it, her officers being under tl
pression that we were building a gunboat. The current of -the
river caused her to sheer off without doing any damage to the
boat. She immediately tacked about, and was about to repeat

]G THE SIEGE OF VIOKSLURc.

the blow, when a shot from one of our batteries near the rail-
road depot struck her on the prow, evidently causing some dam-
age, as she relinquished her purpose, and continued her way
down the river.

The batteries by this time were in full play, and belched out
a constant and rapid stream of shot and shell, but without any
effect, as the most of the balls fell short of the boat. The Queen
of the West steamed slowly down the river, and in a icw min-
utes had safely passed out of range of our lower batteries-,
That she had sustained some injury was evident, as she remained
several days moored up to the Louisiana shore, receiving re-
pairs. Reports from the United States say that she was struct
eleven time-..

The neglect of duty in permitting the Queen of the West to
^urn the point above the city before a shot w7as fired at her, and
the dillaiory manner in which all the batteries acted, raised a
cry of indignation among the citizens of Vicksburg, who wTere
well aware 01l the cause. The statement that we now give, was
witnessed by the author, who can vouch for its truth. As soon
as the first gun was fired from our batteries on the ram, a party
of men, wearing the uniform of officers, wTerc seen issuing from
a building on Washington street, known as the " Apollo Hall."
This building is a theater, the rooms of which are constantly
open. The men referred to were officers in command of our
batteries, idIio had been in this ouildiruj all night on, a drunken
spree.

The same day that the Queen of Lhe 'West passed our batte-
ten deserters from the 3 1st • Wisconsin regiment, cams
js the river and reported Grant's army as numbering from
50,000 to 60,000 men. They also stated that great dissatisfac-
tion existed among the troops on the peninsula, the majority oi
them being desirous of return in gto Memphis. These gt;
cters, did not gain much ere

CHAPTER VII.
PASSAGE OF THE INDIANOLA AND BEE CAPTURE.

3W nights after the running of our batteries by the Queen
of the West, a black object was descried moving down the
river. The night was extremely dark, so dark in fact that the
peninsula opposite our batteries could scarcely be distinguished.
Our guns, however, opened fire on the object, but without being
able to take aim with any accuracy. After firing a flew rounds
our cans ceased, there being an opinion. anions; the officers thai

THE SIEGE OF VICESBUBG. 17

the object seen was nothing but a tree floating down the river.
"Two or three clays after it was discovered to be the iron-clad
gunbcat Indianola that had passed down.

The Queen of the West had, by this time, been captured by
our batteries ou Red River. She was soon repaired, and start-
ing up to Vieksburg with the ram Webb snd gunboat Beattyy
effected the destruction of the Indianola. The^battle that took
place between her and the Confederate boats was a short but
spirited one. The immense superiority in strength, and the
size of her guns, gave the Indianola ■a physical advantage over
her opponents, which were wooden boats.

The Indianola had been chased up the river, to a 6hort
distance above Grand Gulf, when she stopped and offered bat-
tle. The challenge was quickly accepted. Our little fleet ad-
vanced in the following manner : The Queen of the West first,
the Webb second, and the Beatty bringing up the rear. The
Queen of the West ran rapidly pass the Indianola, pouring a
broadside into her, but without effect. The Webb, reversing
her engines, made a dart upon the Indianola, striking her fuU
on the stern, below water mark. The Indianola had been mak-
ing a gallant resistance all the time, but on being pierced by
the ram of the Webb, commenced sinking rapidly. She then
struck her colors and surrendered to the Confederate fleet. Her
officers and crew were transported to the Beatty, and soon after
sent to Vieksburg.

All the damage sustained by our little fleet, was the twisting
of the WaWs ram, in her endeavor to extricate herself from
the Indianola after striking her. All effort to save the Indi-
anola was unavailing, and she now lies sunk in twenty feet of
water. The loss in killed and wounded on both sides-, during
the engagement, was small.

CHAPTER VIII.

CUTTING THE CANAL- YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION-SECOND
SHELLING OF VICKSBURG.

While these events were transpiring, Grant was hard at work
cutting a Canal through the peninsula. The work was prose-
cuted with great vigor, day and night, for nearly two months,
without accomplishing the desired object, namely: the turning
of the current of the Mississippi river. It was stated, by de-
serters, that not less than six thousand soldiers and negroes
were kept constantly at work widening the ditch and making it

18 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

deeper, but without any effect, as not more than three or four
feet of water entered the Canal.

Finding this project a failure, the Yazoo pass expedition was
undei^|ken, but that also resulted in a failure, the enemy being
repulsed at "Fort Pemberton" by the Confederate forces under
Major General Loring. Although this movement may be re-
garded as a portion of the operations against Vicksburg, but
few notes were taken by us, hence the meagre account we give.

Having been repulsed in their Yazoo pass exhibition, the ene-
my's boats returned in the early part of March, and on the ninth
day of that month, two of their gunboats steamed down to the
Louisiana shore, on the west side of the peninsula, and com-
menced throwing shells in the city ; nearly all of them, how-
ever, fell short, and those that did fall in the streets did no
damage to the soldiers or citizens.

On the same day, two dredge boats were observed for the
first time in the canal. Our canal batteries opened fire as soon
as they were perceived, and, after a sharp cannonading, com-
pelled the enemy to remove the boats. The fire from our bat-
tery, bearing upon the mouth of the canal, was then kept up
constantly, with great effect, the enemy being prevented .from
working the boats.

During this week, large bodies of Federal troops were ob-
served massing on the Louisiana shore, opposite Warrenton,
and the idea became strong, that the long looked-for offensive
movement was at last in progress.

CHAPTER IX.

OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF.

A short time before the naval engagement at Port Hudson,
which resulted in the passage of the United States steamers,
Hartford and Albafross, the town of Grand Gulf was occupied
by the Confederate forces, under Brigadier General Bo wen,
and a battery of six guns mounted on the banks of the river.
A line of breastworks had also been made around the position.

Grand Gulf is situated on the East bank of the Mississippi
river, immediately below the mouth of the Big Black river.
Southeast of Grand Gulf is Port Gibson, and befow Grand
Gulf, Northwest of Port Gibson, on the banks of the river, is
Bruinsburg.

The position at Grand Gulf was defended by two brigades of
Missouri and Arkansas volunteers, under Brigadier General
Bowen, of Missouri. This officer, a native of Georgia, but for

THE SIEGE OF 7ICK3BCTB 1 f>

many years an adopted son of Missouri, was one of the bravest
officers in the Confederate array, and his fighting qualities had
won for him a favorable name throughout the Confederacy.
This gallant man, having passed unscathed through the siege of
Vicksburg, died at Clinton on his way trom Vicksburg to Bran-
don, Mississippi, on the 24th of July, 1863, from a disease con-
tracted during the siege. His gallantry and ability as an officer
had just been rewarded by a Major General's commission.

The position at Grand 'Gulf was naturally strong ; and but
for the flank movement of the enemy, and the want of reinforce-
ments, could have been held for an indefinite period.

CHAPTER X.

ATTEMPTED PASSAGE OF THE RAMS. LANCASTER AND

MONARCH.

On the morning of the 25th of March, two of the enemy's
rams, afterwards ascertained to be the Lancaster and Monarchy
made an attempt to pass our batteries. For the first time,
everything was prepared for them ; and as soop as they com-
menced turning the bend of the river above the city, our bat-
teries opened a terrific rire. At the same moment, two build-
ings on the crest of the peninsula were set on fire by our pickets,
and, the light spreading a ray across the river, gave our gunners
full view of the two boats. With increased rapidity, solid shot
was hurled at them, but they calmly and slowly continued then-
way, as if certain they could not be destroyed. Our men at the
batteries worked with the determination that they should not
run the gauntlet uninjured, and redoubled their energies. It
was apparent to the spectators, that both boats had been struck ;
but as they still steamed on their way, it was not believed that
the damage done was of any consequence.

This engagement was a grand and magnificent spectacle.
The day was just breaking, and the mimic thunder from our
guns, the flash of light as they were fired, the piercing scream
of the missiles as they sped through the air, blended with the.
soft light of the breaking day, and formed one of tjie greatest
pyrotechnical displays ever witnessed;

The boats proceeded slowly down the river, followed by a
constant stream of shot and shell from our batteries, but still
they steamed down as if unhurt. A deep feeling of humiliation
pervaded the spectators and men at the batteries, and curses
loud and deep were spoken. At last, just as one of them came
opposite our batteries at the railroad depot, a well aimed shot

20 THE SIEGE OF YICKSBUEG.

from a ten-inch gun pierced her, and she ceased moving. In a?.
few moments, she commenced to sink amid the cheers of the
gnnners and the crowd that were looking on. The Zttnea
for that was the name of the ram, continued slowly sinking for
about fifteen minutes, when she careened, and soon nothing was
seen but a dark speck on the water to denote what had become
of the once boastful and defiant enemy. As soon as she com-
menced sinking, her officers and crew took to her boats and es-
caped to the peninsula, but nothing else was saved from her.

The remaining ram, the Monarch, having been struck repeat-
edly, soon became disabled, but not enough to sink her. She
slowly floated down the river, under a heavy fire from our lower
batteries, and, in a few minutes, had passed out of range. As
soon as she had escaped the fire of our batteries, the Albatross,
which had come up from Port Hudson with the Hartford, met
and towed her to the landing on the Louisiana shore, opposite
Warrenton. The damage done to this boat was of so severe a
nature, that new machinery had to be transported across the
peninsula for her ; and it took several days before she could be
repaired.

The damage done to these two boats, in this attempt to pass
our batteries, fully sustained the opinion that we could always
inflict great injury on the enemy in these demonstrations, if the
necessary amount of vigilance was exercised by the officers com-
manding our batteries. The result of this engagement, in snch
o-laring contrast with that of the Queen of the West, became a-
subject of remark"; and all in Yicksburg anticipated that hence-
forth the officers would dispense with frivolities, and recollect
they were engaged in war with the enemy then before them.

CHAPTER XI.

FAILURE OF THE CANAL-CHANGE OF PLANS.

Strenuous efforts had, meantime, been made by the Federals
to succeed in their canal, but the " Father of Waters" remained
obstinate, and would not consent to " change bis base." Find-
ing all efforts' fruitless, the work was abandoned; and, the ene-
my despairing of capturing Vicksburg, decided upon abandon-
ing their operations, and returning to Memphis. Preparations
were made for their deparaure, and all their tents struck, when
Major General Thomas, Adjutant General of the United States,
and a renegade Southerner, arrived at Big Black. He immedi-
ately countermanded the order to return, and formed a plan
which resulted in the downfall of Vicksburg.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 21

This .plan was to ran a fleet of transports pas3 the batteries,
^ancl cross troops from the Louisiana shore below Vicksburg to
Mississippi, and then march their army through the country to
the rear of Vicksburg. This plan, although the most dangerous
of all yet conceived, and apparently the fruits ot despair, was
adopted, and a move on Vicksburg was immediately resolved
upon. On the night of the 22 d of April, the first demonstra-
tion was made in accordance with the newly-formed plan by the
running pass our batteries of three gunboats and seven trans-
ports, an account of which we will give in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

PASSAGE OF THE ENEMY'S FLEET, AND ATTACK ON GRAND

GULF.

This successful demonstration, while it does credit to the
enemy, reflects the deepest dishonor on the Confederate arms.
Repeated warnings had tailed to impress upon the minds of our
officers the fact that that time was not one intended for mirth
and revelry. They still continued to pursue the course which
had been the subject of censure; and on the night the enemy's
fleet passed down, a large number of officers were attending a
ball given in the city, and not until our upper batteries opened
lire, were they aware of the proximity of the enemy's fleet.

The passing of our batteries by the enemy, took place on
Wednesday night, the 2 2d of April, at about half past twelve
o'clock. At this hour the Yankee fleet, consisting of three
gunboats and seven transports, was observed moving down the
river. Our pickets, on the peniusula opposite, promptly gave
the alarm, and at the same time set fire to two buildings in De
Soto, — the name of the village on the peninsula, — for the pur-
pose of illuminating the river. From some cause unknown, the
fire burned badly. Instead of issuing in a bright blaze, it sent
up a dense smoke which enveloped the river, and, with the
Lion of one beam reflected across the river, completely
Lred the boats. Our guns, however, opened a heavy fire
on them, but without doing any damage of consequence. One
boat was set on fire and burnt in front of the city, but the
others, aided by the darkness, and -the unusually random firing
of our men, succeeded in passing safely.

The fleet, after getting out of range of our guns, which, by
this time, was increased to the number of twenty-eight, moved
to the Louisiana shore, opposite Warrenton, where they remain-
ed for three or four days. We own that there was manyobsta-

22 THE ISIHGE OF VIC9£TBURS.

cles to our preventing the enemy from making the passage, but
giyo it as our opinion that'eonsiderable more damage could have
been done to them had the officers been at their post.

We omitted to mention in our description of the passage of
the fleet, that all the transports were protected by bales of Cot-
ton and Hay lashed to both sides, and almost obscuring the
boats. This was another drawback to our dome: any damage,
for we had not the means at our disposal to set the Cotton and
Hay on fire.

As soon as the enemy's fleet had passed, the Yankee plan of
campaign became fully developed, and all anticipated an attack
on Grand Gulf. In confirmation of this belief, on the 28th day
of April, the fleet, having previously gone down the river, at-
tacked our batteries at that place. An engagement between the
gunboats and our land batteries then took place, and after last-
ing for six and a half hours, the enemy retired, foiled in his
attempt to silence them. Our loss on that day was twelve kill-
ed and wounded. Among the former was Col. Wade, Chief of
Artillery for Bo wen's division, and a gallant officer.

The next day the enemy's fleet, consisting of two gunboats
and six transports, lashed together, ran past the batteries under
a terrific fire, but which did them but little damage, our guns
not being large enough. They then proceeded down until they
eame to the Louisiana shore, opposite Bruinsburg, Miss. The
enemy's troops had previously been marched through Louisiana
to the vicinity of St. Joseph, opposite Bruinsburg. They were
then transported across the river, numbering, as was estimated
by themselves, between fifty thousand and sixty thousand men.
To oppose this force, Brigadier General Bowen's command did
not exceed three thousand. The brigades of General Baldwin
from Smith's division, and Colonel, now Brig. Gen., Reynolds
from Stephenson's, were placed at his disposal as reinforcements,
but remained in Viek sourer until called for.

• C A AFTER XIII.

LANDING OF AE>IY AND BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

Bruinsburg, Mississippi, is situated on the banks of the Mis-
sissippi river, about twelve miles below Grand Gulf, and at the
mouth of BAYOU PIERRE. At this point the enemy landed
between fifty and sixty thousand men on the 30th of April, and
prepared for an advance movement.

As soon as General Bo wen received information of their land-
ing, he crossed Bayou Pierre and advanced towards Port Gib-

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUR6. . 23

son, situated "several miles southeast of Grand" Gulf. In the
vicinity of this place, General Bowen met the enemy advancing
in fall force, and immediately prepared for "cattle, having previ-
ously telegraphed to Vicksbarg for reinforcements.

The enemy, confident in numbers, advanced with spirit and
.tion, hoping to crush our small force with superior num-
bers. Their assaults were gallantly met by our men, and each
attack repulsed. The battle raged with great fury, until about
the middle of the day, when our forces, worn out by their
almost superhuman exertions, were about to fall back. The
enemy perceiving their exhaustion pressed them heavily, and
would have eventually broke our line but for the timely arrival
of Baldwin's brigade from Vicksburg. These gallant men, tired
and exhausted as they were, after a forced march of over twenty
miles, were ordered to advance to the support of Bowen. They
advanced in splendid order, and with loud yells double quicked
to the battle held. The Missourians and Arkansians observing
them made renewed exertion, and recovered a part of the ground
they had lost during the day. At about three o'clock the battle
was raging with awful fury. Our men, as if inspired with de-
moniac strength, fought with a desperation unknown before. —
Large bodies of the enemy could be seen making a flank move-
ment, and fresh troops were thrown on our line of battle as fast
as others were repulsed. In the early part of the engagement,
Wade's battery of Virginia Artillery was captured, by the ene-
my, but in the evening a determined charge, made by Green's
brigade of Missouri and Arkansas troops, recaptured the lost
guns, and brought them safely off. The battle raged with great
violence until nightfall, when darkness put an end to the con-
test, neither party laying claim to a victory.

The loss on both sides was very heavy, and our casualties
were greatly disproportioned to the number of men engaged,
our total loss having exceeded one thousand out of about six
thousand effective men. The loss of the enemy was estimated,
by those present, at between four and five thousand in killed,
wounded and captured.

As soon as the fighting ceased, General Bowen sent in a flag
of truce to General Grant, requesting his permission to bury
that portion of our dead that lay in his lines. The demand was
refused by Grant, who promised, however, that our dead should
be buried, and our wounded well cared for.

That night, no reinforcements arriving as was expected, the
Confederate army fell back and crossed Bayou Pierre, burning
the bridges after them. The retreat was conducted with ordc*
and regularity, every effective man being brought off safely,
except one company of Mississippians, leit by mistake. They
were captured, but afterwards made their escape and rejoined
their regiment. Col. Pettus, of the 20th Alabama, now Brigadier
General, was also taken prisoner, but made his escape by a ruse.

24 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

On the moving after the Confederate army retreated from
Port Gibson, the enemy commenced throwing pontoons across
the creek, and skirmishing lasted all day. Towards evening,
information was brought to General Bowon that the enemy was
landing above Grand Gulf, with the intention of cutting him. oft'
from Vicksburg. The gallant Major General Loring had arrived
at Bowen's headquarters by this time, but without any troops ;
the order to reinforce having been given at too late an hour for
them to arrive with him. A council of war was immediately held,
and it was unanimously determined to evacuate the position, as
from the disparity of numbers, and the want of rations and
ammunition, it could not be held for twenty-four hours.

In compliance with the resolution to evacuate, prompt mea-
sures were taken. Everything was destroyed that could not be
removed — the guns spiked and the magazines blown up. Our
army then rapidly fell back to the Big Black ; and, crossing the
river at Baldwin's Ferry, formed a junction with the main body
of our armv under Lieutenant General Pemberton.

CHx\PTER XIV.

MARCH OF THE ENEMY TO JACKSON, A2W BATTLE OF BA-
KER'S CREEK.

The position of the enemy, after the evacuation of Grand
Gulf, was one of extreme peril. On one flank was Gen. Joseph
E. Johnston with a force, whose strength was unknown to Gen-
eral Grant ; and on the other was Lieutenant General Pember-
ton, with an army between 30,000 to 35,000 strong. To have
remained at Grand Gulf would have ruined the Federal army;
and with this knowledge Grant determined to make a feint'
movement on Pemberton, and by that means detain him on the
West bank of the Big Black, while he marched rapidly on Jack-
son, Mississippi, with his entire force. The object of the Fed-
eral commander was to make sure of no enemy being in his rear
when he marched on Vicksburg.

The ruse succeeded. Whether General Pemberton took any
means of knowing what force the enemy had confronting him
or not, we cannot tell ; but this much we do know : that he re-
mained on the West bank of the Big Black, near Bovina, Mis-
sissippi, with the main body of hi? urmy, until the evening of
the 15th of May, when he received a telegram from General J.
E. Johnston, ordering him to advance immediately and attack
the enemy in the rear, while he (Johnston) would attack him in
front with what forces he had.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 25

It is said that Lieutenant General Pemberton was opposed to
crossing the Big Black, preferring to await the advance of the
enemy but that he was overruled by the majority of his subor-
dinate Generals. This statement is made in defence of his cam-
paign ; but we cannot see in what way it serves to remove the
responsibility from his shoulders. The great error was in not
advancing, on the 12th, when the rear of Grant's armv was
exposed to us, and offered every inducement for an attack,
rheideaof General Pemberton desiring to advance after the
had penetrated into the country, and cut him off from
the river for the purpose of starving him out, was a gigantic
error, as, from General Grant's official report, there was enough
provision found m the country through which he marched to
have supplied his army for three months; besides which, Vicks-
btirg would have been left in a very exposed position by such a
movement. :

A majority of the general officers having decided, on the re-
ceipt ot General Johnston's dispatch to advance and attack the
enomy^ preparations were made to move forward, and on the
loth ot May, the Confederate army took up its line of march
roops beiDg positioned as follows:
Major Genera! Stephenson's division, composed of the bri-
«ded by Brigadier Generals Lee, Barton and Cum-
:-s, and Colonel, now Brigadier General Reynolds, in front-
oeral Loring s division, composed of the brigades commanded
by Brigadier Generals Tilghman, Featherstone, and others, in
the centre; and Bowen's division, composed of two brigades
under Brigadier General Green and Colo bran. There

was also one brigade commanded by T General Bald-

i, detached from Major General M. L. Smith's divisi n, Waul's
on of iexians and Wirt Adam's Cavalry regiment, the
whole making an effective force of between 23,000 and 4 000
bghtmg men. ~ '

The Confederate army marched that day to Baker's Creek

no one being aware of the close proximity" of the enemy, who,'

having intercepted the dispatch ordering Pemberton to advance

divided his forces and, marching rapidly with one body on

Jackson, drove Johnston across Pearl river, and marched the

other towards Big Black,- ibr the purpose of surprising Pern:

berton; On the evening of the loth of May, the Conlederate

in the same position as tlmy occupied the

before; and, alter marching some distance, discerned a

k me oi .the enemy's skirmish , army immediai

•a0]i ^i8*^8 Creek' n:]d' t]ie enemy following, prepared
to give bate. The troops bivouacked that night oh the battle-
:. All the pickets thrown out that night by our forces, con-
ed of a few cavalry on the roads, while our flank and rear
were left entirely unprotected. The next morning skirmishing
commence.,, and the artillery of Stephenson's division was or-

26 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

dered to advance and open fire. In compliance with this com-
mand, the different batteries advanced and nnlimbered their
pieces. As soon as the gunners had taken their proper places
and opened lire, a terrific volley of musketry was poured in
upon them by a large body of the enemy concealed in the woods
not fifty yards distant, which killed and wounded a large num-
ber of the gunners and horses. The fighting then became se-
vere, and resulted in the repulse of our infantry, who, having
but little or no artillery support, were compelled to meet the
attacks of the enemy unsupported. In a few hjurs, nearly the
whole of Stephenson's artillery was captured, and the enemy,
advancing on his flank, soon broke the different brigades. The
men of this division fought with great courage and determina-
tion, but were compelled to fall ba*ek before overwhelming
numbers.

Sometime after the firing commenced, Major General Loring's
division moved rapidly forward, and was advancing to attack
the enemy, when a battery of light artillery, commanded by
one Captain Cowan, of Vicksburg, was subjected to the same
terrific fire from the enemy's infantry, killing nearly all the
horses, and placing hors de combat a majority of the gunners.
The guns were immediately taken by hand and hauled a consid-
erable distance, but were finally left in a swamp, from which
they could not be extricated.

General Loring, perceiving that Stephenson^had lost all his
artillery, and that his infantry, after making a stubborn resist-
ance, was compelled to retreat, leaving his flank exposed, deter-
mined to cut his way through to Jackson, where he could be of
greater service to the Confederacy than falling back to Vicks-
burg. Accordingly, the division was ordered to cross the creek
to the right of where the enemy was posted in large numbers.
The movement was made with celerity and dispatch, but not
before the gallant Brigadier General Floyd Tilghmaii, of Fort
Henry renown, had met his death wound while bravely fighting.
His body was carried to Vicksburg, where it was interred in a
garden.

After crossing the creek and moving off on the enemy's right
flank, we are unaware what movement was made by General
Loring that enabled him to escape with safety, but from the
nature of the country and the large force of the enemy, ^ e must
acknowledge that his safe escape, with his entire division, was
one of the most brilliant feats of the war, and displayed, on the
part of Major General Loring, military skill of high order.

While this movement was being made by Loring's division,
the forces under Brigadier General Bo wen moved quickly for-
ward on the right, and met the enemy just as Stephenson's divi-
sion wTas rapidly falling back. General Bowen rapidly threw
his brigades in front, and then commenced one of the most des-
perate struggles recorded this war. The entire force under

THE SIEGE OF VICXSBUUG. 27

General Bo wen did not exceed live thousand, and opposed to
him was a force, variously estimated, at from forty to sixty
thousand men. Our Hue of battle was rapidly formed, and the
attack of the enemy awaited. Then it was that McPherson's
entire corps advanced on this small body of troops, and endea-
vored, by force of numbers, to crush them. Each charge was
met with almost superhuman courage, and. repulsed. The Mis-
souri troops fought like demons, with the hope of retrieving
the day and gaining a victory. So desperately did this division
■light, that had there been anything like organization among
Stephenson's division, and they had supported Bowen, the bat-
tle might 'have been won. But there was nothing like order
among the majority of Stephenson's division. They had, after
lighting for several hours with the most determined courage
without artillery, and against overwhelming odds, been over-
powered," and were straggling in a demoralized condition to-
wards Big Black. In justice to the gallant Major General Ste-
phenson and his subordinate Brigadier Generals, we would say,
that every exertion was made on their part to rally the men,
but wTith little success. The brunt of the battle then fell on
Bowen's division and the few men of Stephenson's force, who
remained intact.

. Several desperate charges were made by these troops on the
enemy, but, from the large numbers brought against them, with-
out success. One of these charges was made by Gen. Green's
origade of Missouri and Arkansas troops, not numbering over
eleven hundred men. These heroes advanced with the utmost
coolness upon the enemy's forces, consisting of two batteries of
artillery, supported by an entire division. They charged up to
within thirty yards of the artillery, when the Yankee gunners,
who were laying aside of their pieces, drew the string attached
to the friction primers, discharging their guns, and poured in such
a severe volley of canister, as to compel our men to fall back. So
gallantly did these troop3 behave themselves that Major General
McPherson, in conversation after the fall of Vicksburg, is re-
ported to have said, in reference to this charge, that he almost
l< thought it a sin to fire on such brave men."

Lieutenant General' Pemberton is reported to have lost all
confidence after the capture of our artillery. Pie is said to have
crossed the bridge over Baker's Creek, exclaiming to those
around him, " I call upon you, gentlemen, to witness that I am
not responsible for this battle — I am but obeying the orders of
General Johnston." The battle was, in fact, fought without
any one commander. It was left to the Major and Brigadier
Generals to do their best, and which they did ; but, from want
of a general co-operation, effected nothing.

About dusk the Confederate army fell back towards the line
of works erected on the Big Black river. *In the retreat almost
every step of the way was contested by the gallant Bowen and

28 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

his brave men; every endeavor on the part of the enemy to
flank us, being repulsed with heavy loss. Our forces arrived in
safety to the works, which they immediately occupied with what
troops remained in any state of organization, while the enemy,
evidently exhausted at the determined resistance given him by
our troops during the day, made no demonstration that night.
Our total loss in the battle did not exceed six thousand in
killed, wounded and missing, while that of the enemy could not
have been less than ten thousand. This great disparity in casu-
alties, arose from the nature of the ground preventing any large
line, and the enemy being compelled to mass his troops in dense
columns, when making a charge, the fire from our infantry into
their serried ranks was very destructive.

Our loss in artillery was large, not less than thirty pieces hav-
ing been captured. Among the different batteries were :
Co. A. — Withers' 1st Mississippi Artillerv, . 2 pieces.
Cowan's of " a ", " \..6 "

Co. C— " " " " ...G u

Botetourt (Virginia) Artillery, 0 ct

Wofford's of Withers' 1st Miss. Artillery,. A "
We are unable to name the other batteries captured on this
day. Nearly the whole of Stephenson's was captured. One o£
his brigades succeeded in bringing off its artillery safely, and
that was a brigade of Tennesseeans, commanded by Colonel,
now Brigadier General, Reynolds. This ga.lant officer acted
with great skill from the evacuation of Grand Gulf to the fall of
Vicksburg. On the retreat from Grand Gulf, he was placed in
command of the entire baggage train, and although the enemy
twice got in his rear, he eluded them each time, and succeeded
in bringing the wagons across Big Black without the loss of one.
The retreat from, and yielding up of the field, put an end to
the battle. It cannot be denied that this engagement resulted
in a most disastrous defeat to our arms, and one that could have
resulted differently had competent generalship been displayed.

CJIAPTJ

BATti/E OF BIG %hl

On Sunday morning, 17th May, (the day after the battle of
Baker's Creek) the enemy advanced in force against the works
erected on the Big Black. (These works were erected on the
East side of the river, with the object, it is said, of defending
two bridges, and of protecting Snyder's Bluff.) The attack on
our right and left was repulsed, but a panic breaking out in a

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUEG. 29

brigade on the centre, the men deserted their works and left
the line exposed. As soon as the enemy perceived this they
commenced pcnring over the deserted works, thus compelling
our right and left to fall back, which they did rapidly. Nearly
all the artillery saved the day before was lost here, among
which avis two batteries belonging to Bowen's division, which,
for want of horses, could not be jenioved in time. Our army
then retreated towards the liver, and, after crossing, set the
bridge on fire. This, for a while, impeded the pursuit of the
enemy, who were compelled to buildtpontoons before they could
s the river.
Our loss in this engagement was about 1,000, in killed,
wounded and missing. A large number of small arms and
knapsacks were thrown away by our men in their precipitate
retreat from the breastworks. The retreat across the Big Black
ended the engagement — an engagement that can scarcely be
dignified with the name of battle.

CHAPTER XVI.
RETREAT FROM BIG BLACK TO YICKSBURG.

Soon after crossing Big Black, our army became a demoral-
ized body of men ; no order or discipline was observed during
the march ; the men were scattered for miles along the road. —
The sight of such a large body of men, retreating in the disor-
der that they were, was enough to create a panic in the strong-
est mind. A feeling of despondency could be observed among
the troops, and curses, loud and deep, were hurled at Lieutenant
Genera] Pemberton for his mismanagement of the army — many
of the troops declaring their willingness to desert rather than
serve under him again.

At about ten o'clock on Sunday night, the main l^bdy of the
Confederate forces commenced entering Yicksburg, and then
ensued a scene that almost beggars description. Many planters,
living near the city, with their families, abandoned their homes
and entered our lines with the Confederate forces. We were
among the troops when they entered, and never in our life be-
held anything to equal the scene. As if by magic, the stillness
of the Sabbath night was broken in upon, and an uproar, in
which the blasphemous oath of the soldier, and the cry of the
child, mingled and formed a sight which the pen cannot depict.
It was a scene, which, once beheld, cannot be forgotten. There
were mauy gentle women and tender children, torn from their
homes by the advance of a ruthless foe, and compelled to fly to

THE SIESE OF VICKSBURO,.

our lines for protection ; and mixed up with them, in one vast
crowd, were the gallant men who had left Vick3burg three
short weeks before, in all the pride and confidence of a just
cause, and returning to it a demoralized mob and a defeated
army, all caused through one man's incompetency.

CHAPTER XVII.
INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG.

On the arrival of our army within the fortifications at Vicks-
burg, prompt measures were taken to gather the men together
and re-organize the demoralized body of men. Our officers
worked hard, and, by two o'clock on Monday afternoon, had
succeeded in placing the troops in position behind the breast-
works.

On Sunday, Snyder's Bluff and Chickasaw Bayou were evac-
uated, and the troops brought to Vicksburg. The works on
Snyder's Bluff consisted of about sixteen heavy guns, of which
number six were brought away, our forces not having time to
remove the balance. A good deal of stores, heavy artillery, am-
munition and baggage, were left at the above-named points for
want of transportation.

The position occupied by the different divisions, were as
follows : Major General M. L. Smith's division, composed of
Brigadier Generals Shoup, Baldwin, Vaughn, and Buford's brig-
ades, on the left ; Major General J. II. Forney's division, com-
posed of Brigadier Generals Moore's and Hebert's brigades, in
the centre; Major General C. L. Stephenson's division, com-
posed of Brigadier Generals Barton's, Cummings', and Lee's,
and Colonel, now Brigadier General Reynolds' brigades, on the
right; and Brigadier General Bowen's division, composed of
Brigadier General Green's and Colonel Cochran's brigades, held
in reserve. • Waul's legion of Texas cavalry was dismounted,
and served as infantry on Stephenson's line.

When our forces entered the city on Saturday night, our line
of defences was not yet completed, and the men, tired and worn
out as they were, after the privations, marchings and counter-
marchings of the past fortnight, were immediately set to work
on the fortifications. On Monday, at 12 meridian, they were
completed, and the men took their positions to await the ap-
proach of the enemy.

At about two o'clock, the enemy's skirmishers appeared in
front of our works and opened fire, but without doing any dam-
age to the Confederate forces. By dusk they had planted scv-

THE ME*K OF VIOKSBUR ; 31

oral batteries of artillery in position, about lour hundred yards
from our line, but abstained from using them. The sharp shoot-
ing was, however, continued until dark, when it ceased, and
quiet reigned over the city and fortifications.

On Tuesday morning, by daylight, the enemy opened a ter-
rific fire on our line of works, which was quickly responded to
by our guns with fine effect ; the enemy being compelled to shift
his batteries several times. The enemy then endeavored to
throw forward a body of sharpshooters, but a severe fire from
our infantry drove them back, and prevented the execution of
the design. Towards noon the enemy made their first attack on
that portion of our line held by Brigadier Generals Shoup and
Baldwin's brigades. They threw forward a large column, which,
giving a loud cheer, charged upon the works. Our men with-
held their fire until the Yankees had approached to within fifty
yards, when they poured in a terrific and destructive volley of
musketry, doing considerable execution in the serried ranks of
the foe. The enemy wavered a moment, and their indecision
giving our men time to reload ; when they charged again they
were met with a more, galling fire than the first one, which
caused them to break and retire precipitately behind the cover
of the friendly hills. The loss of the enemy in this charge must
have been severe, as the dead in fiont of our line* lay in large
numbers. Our loss was very slight.

No other serious attack was attempted during the remainder
of the day. The attack narrated above, was looked upon more
as an endeavor to "feel" the strength of our forces, than to
gain any important advantage. Artillery firing and sharpshoot-
ing continued for about three hours, when Lieutenant Genera'
Pemberton rode up and ordered our men to cease firing, as he
desired no artillery duels. In obedience to this order the rneR
ceased firing, but the order resulted very badly for us, as the
next morning the enemy, emboldened by our silence, advanced
their artillery one hundred yards nearer than they had thorn the
day previous.

After their repulse in the morning, the enemy kept up a con-
stant fire on our line from their artillery and sharpshooters, dis-
mounting several of our guns, and compelling us to mask the
remainder by hauling them from their position behind the works
to the rear of the hills. The enemy evidently observed the
effects of their fire ; for as soon as a gun was removed from its
position, or dismounted, they would send up a loud cheer of joy,
much to the chagrin of our forces. In one instance, however,
the laugh was turned on them by Brigadier General Louis He-
bert, of Louisiana, who, observing the enemy taking particular
aim at a fine Parrott gun on the right of his line, gave orders
that as soon as a shell struck the parapet near the gun, and ob-
scured it with dust, to remove the piece and make it appear as
if it had been dismounted. A few minutes after the order was

32 THE SIEGE OF VIClvSBURG.

given, a thirty-pound Parrott shell, from the enemy's gun,
struck the parapet, completely enveloping the gun with dust.
The piece was .promptly removed, and as soon as the dust had
cleared away, the enemy, not seeing it any more, set up a loud
cheering, which was heartily responded to by our men, who en-
joyed the ruse highly.

On Wednesday morning, May 20th, at about three o'clock in
the morning, the? enemy opened a terrific fire, from their artil-
lery, upon our line. The lire was absolutely fearful. Shell after
shell came in such rapid succession, that the air seemed alive
with them. The noise made by their shrieks, the loud explo-
sion when they bursted, and the silvery sound they made when
the fragments were falling, created an uproar almost deafening.
This severe cannonading lasted until nearly live o'clock, when it
slackened down to an occasional shot. Firing continued slowly
from their artillery for the balance of the day, while their sharp-
shooters increased their fire perceptibly.

Towards the middle of the day, the enemy's mortars, which
had been placed in position opposite Vicksburg, opened on the
city. These mortars were mounted on large rafts, constructed
for. the purpose, and lashed to the west bank of the peninsula
on the Louisiana shore. A brisk fire was kept up by them until
about four o'clock in the evening, when they ceased and re-
mained silent until next morning.

On Thursday morning at three o'clock the enemy opened the
same heavy fire as they had done the day previous, and kept it
up for about a similar length of time, when it decreased, but
not as much as before. During the day they continued firing,,
increasing its rapidity to some extent, while their sharpshoot-
ers swept our breastworks with a constant stream of minie
balls. Several additional guns were also brought to bear upon
us, their fire beginning to have some effect on our works.

The mortars on the peninsula opened fire in the morning and
kept up a constant and rapid fire all day, but providentially in-
juring no one. The city at this time was filled with women
and the only protection afforded them from the shells, was a
number of caves built in the sides of the hills. General Pem-
berton had made several requests that they should quit the city,
but without effect, as they declared themselves willing to risk
the horrors of a siege rather than leave their homes.

Besides the residents of the city, there were many women
and children, the families of planters, living near Vicksburg,
who entered the city with our army on their retreat from Big
Black. To their credit, be it said, that severe as was the hard-
ships and sufferings they experienced, all these ills were endured
uncomplainingly, their only desire being the successful defence
of the city.

On the evening of the 21st, the enemy ceased firing from
their artillery on our breastworks, but kept up a severe fire

THE SIEGE OF Vl< KSBUBG. 33

from their sharpshooters all night ; the mortars also shelled the
city all night from the peninsula opposite.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE INVESTMENT— GENERAL ATTACK
ON OUR WORKS, AND REPULSE OF THE ENEMY.

On Friday morning, the 2'2d of May, at about three o'clock,
the e^emy opened on the works, their tire exceeding, in severity,
that of any previous morning. Every available gun appeared
to have been brought to bear on our works, and the cannon-
ading continued with unabated fury untiT eleven o'clock, when
it suddenly ceased. This bombardment was the most terrible
endured during the sieg*y and, we believe, the most terrific ever
known in civilized warfare. Nothing conld be heard but one
continual shrieking of the shells, as they came cutting through
the air, and the sharp fiz of the Minie balls as they came by
hundreds whizzing past.

Notwithstanding the severity of this fire, the casualties were
small — a fact which almost seems a miracle, as, from the exposed
condition of our defences, the enemy had enfiladed us on all
sides, and had gained on us a fire in reverse.

At eleven o'clock, as soon as the firing had ceased, the enemy
were discovered forming a line of battle with heavy columns of
infantry. It was in this instance that the bad policy of order-
ing our men to cease firing on the enemy's sharpshooters was
observed. Had we kept up a fire on them during the days pre-
vious to this attack, they would have been compelled to keep at
a further distance, and our gunners would have been able to
open a severe fire upon the columns then forming in line of
battle, and prevented the charge; but as it was, the sharp-
shooters, being allowed to come within one hundred yards of
our position, kept up such a rapid and galling fire on our works,
that the cannoneers could scarcely raise from their position to
load their pieces. With these advantages in their favor, the
enemy formed their line of battle, and advanced to the charge
with but little or no resistance from our artillery.

At about noon, the enemy advanced steadily, and in good
order, pouring in a volley, which did but little or no damage,
our men being protected by the rifle-pits and breastworks, re-
serving their fire until the enemy had approached near enough
to feel its effects. As soon as they had approached to a distance
of about fifty yards from our line of entrenchments, our men
rose from their reclining positions behind the works, and gave
3

31 THE SIEGE OF V£OKSBUR«.

them such a terrible volley of musketry, that they were com-
pelled to fall back, which they did, however, in pretty good
order. On the lines occupied by the brigades of Baldwin,
Shoup, Hebert, Moore and Lee, the heaviest and most deter-
mined assaults were made.

The enemy, after being twice repulsed on Lee's line, were re-
inforced, and made a third charge. Force of numbers gained
for them a momentary advantage, and several of their men en-
tered our works, but the gallant and chivalrous Lee quickly
rallied his men, and, after a severe fight, drove them back with
immense loss. All of those who entered our line were shot.
The enemy, foiled by the desperate lighting of the brave Geor-
gians and Alabaniians, made no further demonstration on this
line of a like nature. Several charges were attempted, but each
was repulsed, with great gallantry, by our men.

The charges on Moore's brigade were heavy and determined,
but were all repulsed with great slaughter to the enemy. So
desperate were the attacks, and so heroically were they made,
that one of the enemy's flags was actually planted on the edge
of the line of breastworks, occupied by the second Texas. The
eolor-bearer who planted it was immediately shot dead by one
of the men, and the colors captured. The Texans acted with
their usual valor, and the Alabamians in this brigade behaved
admirably, keeping up so galling a fire on the enemy as to pre-
vent their approaching near the line occupied by them.

The fighting on Brigadier General Hebert's line was pro-
tracted and desperate, particularly on the immediate right and
left of the Jackson road, occupied by the, third and consolidated
twenty-first and twenty-third Louisiana regiments. Their posi-
tion was one which the enemy desired to obtain above all others,
as, from the nature of the defences, had they carried the road,
Yicksburg would have been lost. Several desperate charges
were made on this line during the day, and had been success-
fully resisted. As often as the enemy were repulsed, they would
return to the charge with fresh troops, and endeavor to carry
the works ; but the gallant men comprising the above-named
regiments, held their ground manfully, and repulsed every at-
tack.

The last charge on the line occupied by the twenty-first and
twenty-third Louisiana, was made by the seventeenth Wiscon-
sin regiment, composed entirely of Irishmen, and bearing the
green flag of Erin. With their entire front rank carrying
scaling-ladders, they rushed upon the works and endeavored to
scale them, the fortifications at that point being erected on a
very precipitous hill. Three times they essayed to plant, but
a sweeping fire from our infantry compelled them to face back.
At the last charge, they approached within twenty yards of out-
works, but such a terrible volley was poured into their ranks,
that they broke and retreated in confusion, leaving their dead

THH SIKOH OF VrCKSBURu. 35

in large numbers lying in front of our line. The Mississippians
ita this brigade acted very handsomely, repulsing every charge
made on their line.

The engagement on Shoup's line was conducted with the
same bravery and success as on the others. The fighting on
Baldwin's lino was also severe, and was attended with the same
success. ' On every portion of the line, the enemy was repulsed
with heavy loss, although their attacks were not so despearately
made on every portion as they were on those portions specially
mentioned. Louisianians, Georgians, Alabamians, Mississip-
pians, Texans and Tennesseeans, behaved with the same valor
and success. The service rendered by Bowen's division of Mis-
sourians and Arkansians, was signal and glorious. With their
usual valor, they reinforced all points threatened by the enemy,
and aided greatly in repulsing them.

The loss of the enemy in this day's engagement, could not
have been less than from 8,000 to 10,000 in killed and wounded.
Their dead lay in large numbers before our works, while thou-
sands of wounded men were carric d off as soon as they fell.
Our total loss did not exceed eight hundred.

A description of this day's fight would be a task too difficult
to undertake. It was a continual booming of artillery, and a
constant rattle of musketry. As each charge was repulsed or
made, the lines would resound with the loud yells of our men
at their success, or the cheer of the enemy as he made the
charge.

Nightfall presented a sad spectacle. Small as our loss had
been, in comparison with that of the enemy, and the severity of
the conflict, many of our best and bravest officers and soldiers
bad fallen — many of the noblest and most devoted patriots had
yielded their life on the altar of their country, and had fought
their last battle in defence of their cause.

While the battlo was raging at the breastworks, an attack
was made on our water batteries by the gunboats, and, after a
•short contest, they were repulsed, and did not renew the en-
gagement again that day. The mortars also kept up a rapid
fire on the city, but without any other effect than partially de-
stroying two or three buildings.

During this tremendous bombardment throughout the day,
stores in the city were Opened as usual, and the streets prom-
enaded by women and children, as if no missiles of death were
filling the air and bursting and scattering the fragments aroimd.
It was a miracle that so few were injured in the city that day.
Nothing but the arm of Providence could have shielded the in-
habitants from death.

36 THE SIEGE OF V 1 CK SBT R«> .

CHAPTER XIX.

CONTINUATION OF THE INVESTMENT. BURIAL OP THE
ENEMY'S DEAD.

The day following the general assaul, and repulse of the ene-
my was ushered in with comparative silence by the enemy.
Only an occasional shot was fired, and their sharpshooters re-
laxed their tire considerably. This gave great relief" to our men,
who were very much exhausted by the severe engagement of
the day previous, and enabled them to move about behind the
works, without running as much risk from the enemy's shells
and bullets as before.

The enemy were evidently very much disheartened at the
terrible repulse they had met with the day previous, and evinced
no disposition to renew the attack ; in anticipation of wbich, ail
the necessary preparations had been made. So humiliated was
Grant at the successful defense mad,e by our forces, deeming
them, as he did, demoralized and broken in spirit, that he made
no request to bury his dead. Many who were dangerously
wounded remained in front of our works, groaning from pain
and calling for help, without any one being able to come to their
assistance. Our men would have assisted them, but the fire of
the enemy prevented their showing themselves above the para-
pet. They were thus left to die through the inhumanity of their
commander; but this brutal and unchristian spirit having been
manifested so often by our foe, no one felt surprised at it.

Sunday morning at daylight the enemy opened lire on us from
his Parrott and other guns, keeping it up all day without inter-
mission, and continuing the fire all night. From the defective
nature of our defences the casualties on our side began to grow
larger, although strenuous exertions were made during the
nights, by the Major and Brigdier Generals, to repair the works
injured by the fire of the enemy, and to strengthen them suffi-
ciently to meet any future connonading. The line occupied by
Brigadier Generals Hebert, Moore, Shoup and Baldwin's brig-
ades was the particular object at which the enemy directed their
fire; a majority of their guns being concentrated at this point.

The mortars on the peninsula opened a steady fire on the city
until the afternoon, when they increased it, and poured in thir-
teen-inch shells with great rapidity until the following morning.
The number of mortars by this time had been increased to five,
and a party sent over the river at night, for the purpose of ma-
king observations, reported the enemy busily engaged construct-
ing works for large siege guns.

On Monday morning, the 25th of May, the enemy opened the
same heavy fire from their artillery and sharpshooters, until
eleven o'clock, when they ceased. The reason for a cessation

THIl BIEGE OP VTCKSBtTH 37

of hostilities, was a flag of truce, which had been sent in by
Lieutenant General Pemberton, offering an armistice until eigh\
o'clock that evening, for the purpose of giving Grant an oppor-
tunity to bury his dead.

From the first engagement on Tuesday to this day, the ene-
my's dead, to the estimated number of three thousand, had re-
mained on the field in front of our works, while many of their
wounded, left by them in their precipitate retreat from the last
Charge on Friday, had died from want of proper attendance.
One of their wounded, (a captain) after remaining on the ground
ih front of Shoup's lino for nearly two days, was removed in the
jjdght by several noble-hearted men of our forces, who crossed
over the rifle pits with a litter, at the imminent peril of their
lives, and bore him safely within our works. On examination,
it was found that his thigh was shattered by a ball, and morti-
fication had ensued. Before ho died he delivered some money
And papers into the hands of the surgeons who attended him,
with his name and address, and requested that after the siege
was over they should be forwarded to his wile — a request that
was honorably complied with. After lingering a short time he
died.

The object 6f General Pemberton in making the offer to
#rant to bury his dead was, to save our men from sickness.
The dead bodies, beneath the influence of a burning sun, had
become decomposed, and filled the air with an awful stench.
From their proximity to our works, the men were considerably
affected by the unwholesome air they were compelled to breathe,
anfl great fears were entertained that it would result in an epi-
demic, unless some measures were taken to have the dead bu-
ried. Although our requesting Grant to bury his dead, was, iu
a measure, yielding somewhat to the enemy, the circumstances
under which the deviation from dignity occurred, made the re-
quest perfeotly right.

The offer for a cessation of hostilities for eight hours having
been accepted, the dead were removed by % party detailed from
our army, and carried to the enemy's picket lines, where they
were buried. While the dead were being removed, many of
crar officers left our line, and going to the neutral ground, be-
tween the two armies, engaged the Federal officers in conversa-
tion. While out there, newspapers, and other small articles,
were exchanged by our men tor tobacco. The author of this
work, in company with Dr. E. MeD. Coffey, Chief Surgeon of
Bo wen's division, went out with the other officers, and held :)
conversation with a party of Federal officers, of about a half
hour's duration. They expressed themselves very much dissat-
isfied at the result of "Friday's engagement, and observed that,
from our repeated defeats, they had not anticipated any attempt
on our part to hold the city. They, however, appeared confi-
dent in their ability to starve us out, and said, on our observing

38 THE SIEGE OF VK KSBIKG.

that there was no chance of such a thing occurring : " Oh, we
know that you cannot hold out longer than two months at fur-
thest." On our remarking that we could hold out until John-
ston advanced to our relief, they observed that we were depend-
ing on a broken reed, as they were well aware of the strength
of our forces under Johnston, and they knew he had not men
enough to. attack them with; besides, said they, " we are looking
for reinforcements dmly, and they will arrive long before John-
ston can organize an army, even if he intends doing so. Our
reinforcements, with the aid of the Big Black river, will be
ample to hold him in check until you are starved out."

As soon as the time agreed upon for a cessation of hostilities
had expired, the enemy renewed their artillery firing and sharp-
shooting, but in a very feeble manner. The mortars on the
peninsula in front of the city kept up a heavy tire, throwing
their shells to the rear of our works, and by that way cross their
fire with that of the besieging army in the rear.

The usual amount of* firing continued on Tuesday, with little
or no loss to the garrison, which by this time had become per-
fectly indifferent to the missiles falling continually around them.
They had become so used to the shells bursting areund them,
that they were made rather a subject of jest than of fear. The
only missiles from which they apprehended danger, were the
hundreds of Minie balls constantly whizzing past them.

About this period the first courier that managed to elude the
Federal army entered Vicksburg with dispatches from General
Joseph E. Johnston to General Pemberton. On the receipt of
the dispatch a circular was issued by the Lieutenant General
commanding, giving a synopsis of the news, which was to the
effect that "General Johnston was at Canton, Mississippi, with
an organizing force;" that "lie requested the Lieutenant Gene-
ral to hold out as long as he could, tfec." It was also stated in
the circular that a portion of General Bragg's army was ordered
to General Johnston, and that they were then moving towards
Jackson, Mississippi. The circular also gave our forces the first
intelligence they had,*from Southern sources, of the capture of
Winchester by Lieutenant General Ewell, and the invasion of
Pennsylvania.

As might be supposed, the receipt of this intelligence, with
the hope of relief that it held out, lent new vigor to the garri-
son, and although they had already been reduced to quarter ra-
tions, they were cheerful, and evinced a fresh determination to
hold the works until the siege could be raised by Johnston.

The firing from the peninsula on the city had perceptibly
increased ; eight mortars and siege guns were now playing on
Vicksburg ; the enemy had erected strong breastworks in front
of our line in the rear of the city, and had brought a large
number of guns to bear upon us, while the bombardment and
sharpshooting continued unceasingly.

THE SIEGE OF VIGKSBUCG. 39

CHAPTER XX.

SINKING OF THE IRON-CLAD CINCINNATI— MINING OPER-
ATIONS OF THE ENEMY— HARDSHIPS OF THE SIEGE.

Wednesday morning, the 27th of May, was ushered in with
the same unceasing stream of shells and Minie balls pouring
over the breastworks, our men looking- on their advent as a
matter of course. The tiring from the mortars still continued,
with little or no intermission, from the peninsula, while frag-
ments of, and thirteen-inch shells could be seen scattered in
every part of the town.

At about ten o'clock on this morning, several of the enemy's
gunboats below the city advanced a short way up the river, and
opened a rapid tire on our lower batteries, but without doing
any particular damage. While this bombardment was going
on, one of the enemy's boats, the iron-clad ram Cincinnati,,
steamed down from the fleet, behind the peninsula, and opened
tire on our water battery above the city. As soon as she had
got in range of our guns we opened fire. She replied with
remarkable rapidity, pouring broadside alter broadside of grape
and canister at the" battery." The men at the guns stood up to
their posts gallautly, tiring shot and shell at the Cincinnati as
fast as possible. Their guns, however, being too small, had lit-
tle or no effect upon theTiron sides of the ram, all of them that
struck tier glancing off like an india rubber ball.

On the hill belowT the water battery was a battery containing
one eight-inch Brooks gun, under the command, we think, of
Captain Johnson, of the 1st Tennessee heavy artillery regiment.
This gun was one of the finest pieces of ordnance in Vioksburg,
and had obtained the soubriquet of " Whistling Dick," from the
shrill whistle of its shells as they sped through the air. Soon
after the Cincinnati had steamed* down and opened fire on the
water battery, " Whistling Dick" was brought to bear upon
her, and the shrill whistle of its shells was soon heard. The
engagement had lasted several minutes, the firing on both
Sides increasing in rapidity, and still the iron-clad continued to
pour volley after volley into the water battery, upon the hold-
ing of which depended the safety of the extreme left of pur
line; at last a well-directed shot from a Whistling Dick" pierced
her armor, and, as if fortune had changed in favor of our forces,
several other shots in rapid Succession wTcnt crashing through
her iron plating. In a few moments she was disabled and in a
sinking condition. She immediately backed up the river, be-
ing afraid to turn and expose her broadside to our guns, and
ran aground on the Mississippi shore, in full range of our guns,
but within the enemy's picket line. Our batteries continued
bring on her until she tf i ssly disabled, when they ceased.

40 THE SIEGE OF YICKSBURG.

As soon as the Cincinnati was run aground, her officers and
crew took to their boats and escaped, with the exception of a
few, who fell into our hands. They reported that the attack
by the Cincinnati had been made in accordance with the request
of Major General Sherman, who had said that if she could
silence the water battery, and shell our men from their works,
there would be no difficulty in his entering the city, as the
battery was the only obstacle in his path. This statement was
no doubt correct, as Sherman's entire corps rested on their
arms during the engagement, as if waiting for the battery to
be silenced, for them to storm the works. No attempt was
made, however, on the Hue, in consequence of the sinking of
the Cincinnati.

After the destruction of this boat, the enemy's fleet made no
demonstration of the like nature during the remainder of the
siege. The enemy being satisfied, no doubt, of the inability of
iron-clad boats to remain in one position and engage, land bat-
teries. This engagement proved the superiority of land batte-
ries over war vessels, even when iron clad. Had the Cincinnati
desired it, she could have run past the batteries, without being
injured in the least, but all her modern improvements failed when
she stood up squarely to give and receive a broadside. During
the engagement between the iron-clad and our batteries* nothing
transpired on the line, beyond the usual amount of artiliery fir-
ing and sharpsheoting.

After their repulse on the 2 2d of May, the enemy, finding
that our position could not be taken by storm, commenced min-
ing. The reason of the enemy's coming so close to cur works
art to be able to dig under them, was the want of foresight in
Gen. Pemberton's order prohibiting the expenditure of ammu-
nition. Not being permitted to use the artillery, or to return
the fire of the sharpshooters, our men were compelled to safe the
enemy approach nearer every day, until they had worked their
way to within thirty yards of our breastworks. That this'could
have been prevented, was the opinion of many prominent officers
of the-garrison, who favored our throwing out a body of picked
men every day to act as sharpshooters, and prevent the enemy
from making his approaches. If this could not have prevented
them entirely from approaching, it could have, at least, prevent-
ed their mining our works.

The enemy, having been permitted to approach as near >;
above described, went vigorously to work, mining our line of
entrenchments at various , places, the principal point being on
the left of the Jackson road, held by the third Louisiana, of
Hebert's brigade. The means at our disposal for annoying
them in their labor, were limited to throwing a few hand gren-
ades at their working parties, but these had little or no effect,
as the .fuses attached to them being very often too long, the en-
emy would pick them up before they exploded, and throw them

THE SIEGE OF TICKSBtTBG. 41

back. The enemy, at first, worked only in the night, but pushed
on their operations with untiring energy and determination.
Had the sharpshooting been less severe, some effort would have
been made to drive them out with musketry ; but the Minie
balls swept the line of entrenchments night and day, making it
almost certain death for any of the men to show their bodies
above the parapet of our works ; at the same time, the greater
portion of our artillery had been dismounted or disabled by the
lire of the enemy. This was occasioned from the open con-
dition of Our worlds, the positions for the guns being all exposed,
while the guns themselves were all en barbette, which rendered
them easily dismounted by the fire of the enemy, and prevented
our gunners from working them.

These circumstances, discouraging as they were, did not cause
the least fear on the part of the men ; and although they were
Well aware that a* soon as the enemy completed their mines, the
works would bo blown up, their patriotic ardor remained un-
abated; the garrison was filled with enthusiasm for their cause,
and expressed the same unflinching determination — as they had
done before the works were mined — -to maintain their position
so long as they could fire a gun. In fact, the spirit of oar men
seemed to rise with the danger ; their confidence in their ability
to repulse the enemy, should ho attack again, was still the same ;
all had but one desitc : the successful defense of the city they
had so long been fighting to hold.

It was about this period that the hardships and privations <>i
a siege began to be comprehended and oxperioncetl. From the
sfHallness of the garrison, and the extent of our line, it required
every available man to occupy the works. The troops were thus
compelled to remain behind the breastworks and in the rifle-
pits for weeks without removing from their crouching positions,
and subject to the different changes of weather. Very often
a storm would rise, and the rain come pouring down, drenching
them to the skin, and they would be unable to leave the works
for the purpese of changing their clothing, but were compelled
to remain in their damp and unhealthy garments, until the sun
shone again and dried them. It is, therefore, no surprise that
the list of sick in the garrison was largo and daily increasing.
Their food had to be cooked by details of men from each com-
pany, and brought to them at the breastworks, and they re-
Biaincd for weeks together without either washing their clothes
or bathing themselves. Under this accumulation of hardships,
they bore themselves manfully ; and although it was apparent
that the life they were then leading would soon break down
their constitutions, and weaken them beyond the powers of en-
durance, not a murmur was heard, or a voice raised expiv
discontent.

For a period of about live days after the siege commenced,
the garrison was pretty comfortable as food was con-

42 THE SIEGE OF VICK6BURG.

oerned, as they were allowed full rations. At the expiration of
that time, however, Major General C* L. Stephenson, who had
been appointed Chief of Subsistence, perceived that the supply
of provisions on hand at that time would not last many days, if
the soldiers continued to receive the allowance provided for
them by the regulations. The rations were then gradually re-
duced, until it reached the following small amount of food,
daily issued to each man as rations for twenty-four hours :

Flour, or meal 4 ounces.

Bacon \ . . .4 "

Rice H "

Peas, (scarcely eatable) 2~ u

Sugar s t;

the whole making a total of fourteen and a half ounces of food
per day, or less than one-quarter the amount of rations usually
issued to the men as full allowance. This small amount nat-
urally brought the men to the verge of starvation, and was en-
tirely inadequate to supply the cravings of nature. Though the
men felt that such was the case, and saw that, under this par-
tial starvation, their strength would soon fail, all cheerfully sub-
mitted to the inexorable necessity that had reduced them to such
;i strait.

CHAPTER XXI.

SORTIES ON THE ENEMY'S LINE-ERECTION OF "LOGAN
FORT" BY THE ENEMY.

The days intervening from the tweney-seventh of May to the
first of June, were devoid of any movement, on the part of the
enemy, of interest. The cannonading and sharpshooting con-
tinued at times severely ; while at other times it would slacken
considerably. Several sorties were made by details from the
different brigades in our army, which, in a measure, relieved the
monotonous life our soldiers were leading. One of these sorties
was a brilliant affair. It was made by Brigadier General Lee,
and resulted in the capture of nearly two hundred of the enemy
belonging to an Indiana regiment. The attack was made with
great skill and caution, and took the enemy completely by sur-
prise, as they never imagined we would Venture on any such
undertaking.

Shut up as the garrison was, and completely surrounded by
the enemy, we were completely ignorant of everything trans-
piring outside of the city, except on the safe arrival of a courier
in our lines. Asthese were of rare occurrence, we remained in

THE SIEGE OF VICKSErEG. 43

profound ignorance of the true state of affairs outside nearly ail
the time. As will be found in all places, rumors of every kind
and any quantity were 'circulated among the garrison, tending
for a while to elate them with the hope of a speedy relief, all of
them however turned out false, much to the chagrin of the sol-
diers whom the reports had deceived.

In the night the pickets of both armies would abstain from
tiring, and would sit down and engage in conversation, each
bragging of their ability to whip the other. Many of these in-
terviews were very amusing, and the incidents that occurred
were the source of much laughter to our men, who would show
their wit at every opportunity, for the purpose of exasperating
the enemy. At one time, so familiar had the pickets become,
; they would meet one another on the neutral ground be-
tween the two armies and discuss the merits of the war. The
defense on both sides would be carried on with considerable
vehemence, until argument failed on one side or the other, when
vhey would separate to avoid, as a Yankee told one of our men
H'lio had argued him beyond reply, any fighting over the sub-
ject ! As soon as this familiarity was discovered, strict orders
were given to prohibit its continuation, and in a measure it was
stopped, nevertheless some "good joke" occurring between them
would leak out now and then, but as the parties with whom it
took place could never be discovered, the officers were obliged
to laugh at the joke, and leave the disobedient party unpunish-
ed. In these conversations the different motives which occupied
the opposing forces and impelled them to light, would be appar-
ent and form a striking contrast, The conversation of tbje
Yankee would be principally directed to the fine country they
had gone through, and its capacity for making money, while
*hat of the Confederate soldier would be a defense of his coun-
try, and his determination never to go back into their accursed
Union. We do not mention this from prejudice to the Yankee,
or from what was reported to us by other parties, but from the
strict character of Grant's army, and the sordid motives actuat-
ing them, and their conversation with us after the surrender.

On the first ot June the enemy kept up a heavy fire, both in
front and rear, from his mortarB, Parrott's and other guns, and
his sharpshooters poured thousands of Minie balls into our line.
The enemy's sharpshooters were all splendid marksmen, and
effectually prevented any of our men from rising above the par-
apet on pain of certain death, while it was an utter impossibility
for our cannoneers, to load the guns remaining in position on
our line, without being exposed to the aim of a dense line of
sharpshooters.

Our Hue of works, as planned by Major General M. L. Smith,
was as good as could be desired, but the execution of his plans
was the most miserable ever performed by men claimin g to be
engineers. There were several !a;:hs in the const of

44 THE BIE&B OF VICKSB'JKG.

these works, the principal of which were : first, they were not
high enough; second, they -were not built sufficiently thick;
and third, the bastions on which the guns rested were entirely
too much exposed, and afforded no protection to the gunners.

There was a hill on the immediate left of the Jackson road,
which ought to have been occupied by our forces, as it com-
manded that portion of our works afterwards held by the third
Louisiana regiment. Brigadier General Louis Hebert, one of
our ablest and most gallant officers, desired to hold this hill at
the commencement of the siege, and before the enemy had in-
vested us, but was prevented from so doing, we suppose, by
order of his superior officers. This hill was afterwards occupied
by the enemy, and a fort, known as " Logan Fort," erectea on
it. This position appears to have been entirely overlooked by
our engineers, or its importance was very much undervalued.

So badly were the works erected, that three days after the
siege oommenced the enemy had enfiladed us, and a few days
after that, opened a fire in reverse. We were thus subject to a
eontinuai fire from all quarters. The number of pieces of artil-
lery brought to bear upon our defenses, could not have been
less than from two hundred and fifty to three hundred of all
descriptions and calibres. This large number of guns, keeping
up a constant fire on our lines, naturally created an uproar
almost deafening, and as a result, thousands of shells were
poured into our works. There was no portion of the space of
ground in our lines but where whole shells and fragments of
shells could be seen, while at the line, and about one hundred
yards from it, thousands upon thousands of Minio balls covered
the road and woods. Enough of these little missiles could have
been picked up in half an hour to have supplied our army for a
dav.

CHAPTER XXII.

SPIES IN THE CITY. CONDITION OF THE CITY. FIGHT
BETWEEN THE ENEMY AND A TENNESSEE REGIMENT.

On Tuesday, the second of June, it was expected that the en-
emy would make a second general assault on our works, from
certain suspicious movements of theirs the night previous. In
accordance with this, preparations were immediately made to
meet the threatened attack, and to give the enemy a warm re-
ception on his assault. The day passed, however, without their
attempting anything more than the customary bombardment,
except on the peninsula, where the enemy appeared to slacken
their fire somewhat, not caring to strain their mortars too much.

THE SIEGE OF VKKSBfRO. 45

On the night of the first of Jane, several buildings in the
city, on Washington street, were set on fire by incendiaries,
and burnt down, while the parties who set them on fire were
never discovered* That there were spies and emissaries of the
enemy in the city is beyond a doubt true ; as we were informed
by a gentleman of reliability, that two or three days before the
incendiarism narrated above took place, a man clad in the ene-
my's uniform, and to all appearance a stranger in Vicksburg,
was observed walking about the city; several questions he pro-
pound d excited the suspicions of the party to whom he ad-
dressed them, and after answering them in an evasive manner,
the party hastened to give information to the provost guard
r.Tig the singular appearance of this man, and the suspi-
cious questions he had asked. A guard was immediately started
after hi in, and after awhile discovered him walking up one of
the streets. As soon as he observed them approaching him with
the party ho had previously questioned, he must have defined
what they were coming for, for he immediately started off at a
run, pursued by the c^uard for some distance, until he arrived at
some deserted buildings, which he entered. When the guard
arrived they went into the building after him, but he could not
be discovered. That he was a spy is evident, and we feel sure
that he was well acquainted with the buildings he entered, other-
wise he would have been captured.

The damage done to the city up to this date was small, when
we consider the amount of shells that had been thrown into it.
It is true that a great many buildings had been struck, but none
demolished ; all of those struck were still tenable, and were
occupied by the different families during the brief moments
that the enemy's mortars were silent. After the first excitement
was over, the citizens became quite hopeful of the result, and
from the exaggerated reports brought by couriers of the strength
of Johnston's army, it was confidently believed that the day of
relief would soon come, and that the siege would be shortly
raised. Not the slightest fear was expressed of the city ever
falling into the hands of the enemy; not a man, woman or child
believed such an event at all likely to occur, but all anticipating
the defeat and destruction of Grant's army as soon as Johnston
arrived with the fifty thousand men he was reported to have
under his command.

The same course of shelling and sharpshooting continued,
without anything of importance being attempted by the enemy.
They had now decided on a regular investment of the city, and
determined upon making gradual approaches by means of their
engineers and sappers and miners, until they could come up close
to our works, when they would make another endeavor to storm
our lines ; if unsuccessful, they would then keep us penned up
until starvation compelled the garrison to capitulate. That
such was their idea we were repeatedly informed by their ^ckets.

46 THE STEGE OF VlCKfiBtTROr.

Until the twenty-fifth of June, nothing of interest transpired,
except at one or two points along our lines, and an occasional
sortie by the garrison on the enemy's works. One night, a
sharp skirmish took place beyond our picket lines, between a
body of the enemy and a regiment of Tennessceans belonging
to Reynolds' brigade. The regiment had gone out for the pur-
pose of cutting wood for fuel and cane tops for the horses, they
being compelled to subsist wholly on that, all the fodder bcini-
exhausted, and the corn ground into meal for the soldiers. As
was customary, they carried their arms with them, so as to be
prepared in case of emergency. "While in the midst of their
work, the Yankee pickets opened fire on them. As this act of
the enemy was contrary to their usual habit, it so exasperated
the men that, throwing down their axes, they siezed their arms
and drove in the pickets. The enemy, alarmed at this demon-
stration, quickly threw forward a large body of their infantry,
who met the Tennessceans just as they were driving in the pick-
ets. A brisk fight ensued, in which the Tennesseeans behaved
very gallantly, and succeeded in cutting off and capturing a
large number of the enemy. On another occasion a sortie made
by our forces resulted very successfully, our men capturing Lt.
Col. Cann, of an Illinois regiment, and several of the enemy,
besides spiking one of their guns.

Instead of encouraging these expeditions, Lieutenant General
Pemberton appeared disposed to stop them. An expedition was
organized one night for the purpose of storming the enemy's
works on the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and throwing the
mortars and guns into the river, by that way saving the city
considerable injury from the enemy's shells, and the inhabitants
from annoyance. A letter was sent in to Lieutenant General
Pemberton, requesting his permission for the party to cross the
river on the first dark night, and make the attempt, but the
General refused his consent, on the ground that it was too dan-
gerous an experiment ; besides which, he was certain it could
not be successful. Had the permission been granted, we are
pretty certain it would have resulted favorably to us, as the
party who would have attempted it were picked men, of daring
and courage, and men upon whom reliance could have been
placed. After this reply, however, the idea was abandoned,
and was not again thought of 'during the remainder of the

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBt 4f

CHAPTER XXIII.

fcteNDITION OF VICKSBURG. CONDUCT OF THE INHABI-
TANTS. SPIRIT OF THE WOMEN.

By the middle of June, Vicksburg was in a deplorable condi-
tion* There was scarcely a building but what had been struck
by the enemy's shells, while many of them were entirely demol-
ished. The city had the appearance of a half-ruined pile of
buildings, and on every street unmistakable signs of the fearful
bombardment it had undergone, presented themselves to the
observer.

Many families of wealth had eaten the last mouthful of food
in their possession, and the poor class of non-combatants were
on the verge of starvation. The situation of the latter was in-
deed terrible ; for while the former class of population were
able to buy what little food remained in the hands of the heart-
less speculators, at such prices as they — money-grasping and
unpatriotic creatures — would demand, the poor people were
without money, and consequently their sufferings were terrible.

It is true there was not much provision in the city ; in tact
there was scarcely any. At the same time, the prices charged
for what was there, were such as to make a man wonder wheth-
er the sellers had the slightest touch of pity in them. Shut up,
as they were in our lines, with a knowledge that at any moment
one, of the hundreds of shells falling around them, might end
their existence, their thirst for money remained unabated, and
the holders of what food there was, actually asked and received
the following prices : Flour, five dollars per pound, or nearly one
thousand dollars per barrel ; meal, one hundred and forty dollars
per bushel ; molasses, ten and twelve dollars per gallon; and
beef, (very often oxen killed by the enemy's shells, and picked
up by the butchers,) at t'.vo dollars and two dollars and a half
per pound. As we are unacquainted with the names of these
infamous parties, we are unable to publish them to world, to
receive the scorn their conduct merits.

The military authorities assisted these poor unfortunat
much as they possibly could, and Lieutenant General Pei
ton gave them the privilege to grind all the corn they could get
at the government mills ; but this assistance went but a small
way to relieve their wants, and they would undoubtedly have
perished but for the benevolent and generous conduct of the
wealthier classes of citizens, who set to work for the pur-
pose of averting the horrors which threatened them. Among
those who aided with their time and means in this highly mer-
itorious work, we take great pleasure in giving the names of

W. H. Stevens, Rev. Rutherford, of the Methodist

Church; Victor F. Wilson, and a German by the name of J,

48 THE SIEGE OF VtOKSBFRG.

Kaiser. This last named gentleman acted nobly. He had sev-
eral hundred bushels of corn at his residence, which he handed
over to a committee appointed for the purpose, reserving for
himself just enough to last his family during the siege. We
make particular mention of his conduct, because it was an act
of charity rarely met with in his nation, and the exception, on
his part, deserves more than a passing notice. There were
many other citizens of Vicksburg who acted liberally towards
the half-starved poor of the city, but we have not been able to-
obtain their names.

We cannot frame words of sufficient eloquence to express our
admiration for the noble manner in which the women in the
city acted during the siege. Never, we believe, did the Car-
thagenian women evince more patriotism during the siege of
Carthage, than did the spirited and noble-hearted women of
Vicksburg. It is true that they were not called upon to make
as many sacrifices as the women of Carthage were, a fact which
only arose from the different ages in which they lived. Among
the poorer classes of women; the feelling of patriotism was
strong, and the desire for a successful defense was apparent in
their conversation, while the feeling among the wealthier class
of women almost amounted to a wild enthusiasm. Never, du-
ring this war, have their devotion to, and interest in, the cause
been so severely tested, and never has the bright light of patri-
otism shone in mankind with as much brilliancy as it did in the
hearts of the women of Vicksburg, during the forty-seven davs
the siege lasted. Amid the stream of mortar and Parrott shells
that came pouring on the devoted city, bursting around them,
and creating an uproar, as if all the demons of hell had broken
loose, and were ascending to earth, these heroic women re-
mained unawed. On the 22d of May, when the enemy endeav-
ored to storm our works, the anxiety, on their part, that we
should succeed in repnlsing them, and the joy they evinced at
learning we had gained the day, were of the most striking na-
ture, while, on the day of the engagement with the Cincinnati^
alarge number of them congregated on the most prominent
points in the city to witness the fight, regardless of the shells
bursting above them, and the fragments falling around.

As might be expected, several of the women and children
were killed or wounded during the siege ; among those who
were unfortunately struok by the balls and shells, we only recol-
lect the following as killed : Miss Holly, Mrs. Cescie, and a Miss
Jones. Among those who were wounded are a Mrs. Hazzard,
Mrs. C. W. Peters, Mrs. W. H. Clements, Mrs. Major T. B.
Read, Miss Lucy Rawlings, Miss Margaret Cook, and a Miss
Hassley. These are only a portion of those whe got injured,
the remaining names we were unable to prooure.

Notwithstanding the heavy list of casualties among the wo-
men and children, their spirit remained unbroken, and the same

fiE OF VICKSBUBG. 49

desire was expressed among them, that the city should be suc-
cessfully defended. Even those who were wounded, half forgot
their pains in the height of their patriotism, and suffering as
they were from their wounds, their unanimous desire was, that
the city should be held until relief should come, even if they
had to die for it. The conduct of these heroic women should
be remembered long after the independence of the South is-
achieved, and though their names will never be known, the fu-
ture historian of our struggle for freedom, should <?olight to
honor and praise the exalted heroism and patriotic virtues of
these women, many of whom, delicately nurtured, and reared
amid all the luxuries that wealth could afford, preferred to
suffer the pangs of hunger and live in damp caves, or endure
the pains of wounds inflicted 'by the missiles of the enemy,,
which even strong men have groaned under, rather than see the
home of their nativity surrendered to the enemy of their coun-
try; and we believe that, had it been necessary, they would
have been found at our entrenchments ready to aid, as much as
their feeble powers could afford, in the defense of Vieksburg.
Though the pen of the writer of this work, cannot indite words
sufficient to portray the nobleness they exhibited during the
memorable siege ot forty-seven days duration, in future days
he trusts that some one, more gifted than himself, will show to
the world, as examples of feminine patriotism and endurance,
the HEROINES OF VICKSBURC .

CHAPTER XXIV.

EXPLOSION O: ? THE EXELIY'S MIXES-PARTIAL DE-

STRUCTION OF A PORTIOX OF OUR WORKS- SEVERE

:;n:gagement axd repulse of the foe.

On discovering that the enemy were engaged in mining our
works, an our inability to prevent the prosecution of

their work, measures were immediately taken to countermine
and blow up the working parties of the enemy. These attempts
however were not successful, as the inadequate means at our
command, and the position of the hills on which our works
were erected, rendered any undertaking of this nature very dif-
ficult. On one portion, of the line occupied by Major General
M. L. Smith, the countermining was partially successful, several
of the enemy having been killed when it was blown up ; even
this, we cannot vouch for, not having been present at the explo-
sion, although the information was received from a very good
source. *

50 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

The enemy, by means of their sappers and miners, had grad-
ually approached, until they had erected powerful works within
thirty yards of some portions of our line. On the left of the
Jackson road, they had occupied the hill, mentioned in a pre-
vious chapter, and erected a large fort on it. This hill was on
the immediate left of the road, about thirty yards distant from
the line of fortifications occupied by the third Louisiana, of
Hebert's brigade. As we stated before, it was a very high and
strategic position, entirely overlooking our works, and which
Brig. General Hebert desired to hold, on the Monday his troops
were placed in position, being apprehensive of the enemy taking
possession of it, which would have enabled them to have kept
up a destructive fire on the third Louisiana, and also enfilade
the road held by the consolidated twenty-first and twenty-third
Louisiana regiments. His desire not being granted, the hill was
left to the enemy, who quickly perceived the advantageous po-
sition they had gained, and put it to good use accordingly.

From this point the enemy kept up a constant and concentra-
ted fire on the works> and from the vigor with which he bom-
barded them; it became apparent that this position would be the
principal point of attack. It was at first thought that the con-
centration of their fire on this particular point, was an endeavor
to destroy the works, but it was afterwards discovered as only
intended to cover their mining operations, under the fort com-
prising a portion of our defenses on the left of the road, which
from the advantages possessed by the enemy, progressed rapid-
ly, and was soon in a state of completion.

As soon as this was discovered, General Hebert, who had
shown considerable skill and valor during the siege, set to work
and endeavored to foil them in their efforts. He first had a
number of hand grenades manufactured, which he directed to
be thrown at the enemy's working parties, and in a measure
stopped the prosecution of their work for a time, but this even
failed, as the enemy worked perseveringly in the night, and suc-
ceeded in making an excavation under the fort of sufficient size
to protect them from the hand grenades, while our men were
unable to throw them in the hollow formed, in consequence of
the slanting construction of the parapet.

Having failed in his endeavor to prevent the enemy from mi-
ning the fort, General Hebert immediately set to work, and had
a new line, of some length, built in the rear of the threatened
point. The work under his superintendence was pushed for-
ward with as much alacrity as the number of laborers he could
command could push it forward.

The work having been at last completed, by the twenty-fifth
of June the majority of the third Louisiana were removed from
the mined fort and positioned in the new line, which was very
close to its rear. Previous to this, the enemy must have com-
pleted their mine, and made preparations to blow up the fort,

THE 3rEGE OF VICKSBCSG. 51

for between four and five o'clock on the evening of this same
day, their train was fired, and a terrific explosion took place.
Huge masses of earth were thrown up in the air, and those who
experienced it, state that the ground was shook as if from an
earthquake or a volcanic eruption. As soon as the earth was
rent, a bright glare of fire issued from the burning powder, but
quickly died away, as there was nothing of a combustible nature
in the fort to ignite. In consequence of the men having been
previously removed from the work, but few of them were in-
jured, but all of them were considerably jarred by the shock.

Perceiving the fort partially destroyed, a column of the ene-
my's infantry, which had laid concealed in the hollow beneath
the fort all day for the purpose, rushed forward with loud cheers
for the purpose of gaining possession of the ruins. They were
gallantly met, and a desperate struggle ensued. The third Loui-
siana, which is without doubt one of the best fighting regiments
in the service, stood up manfully against overwhelming numbers,
and despite every exertion on their part to storm the line, held
them in check, until the sixth Missouri, another gallant regiment,
under Col. Eugene Erwin, had arrived and reinforced them. As
soon as they arrived, Col. Erwin, who was ahead of his men,
immediately ascended the parapet of the ruined fort, when a
Minie ball, from one of the sharpshooters, pierced his heart and
he fell dead. He was a grandson of Henry Clay, and from the
•commencement of the war an ardent supporter of the South.

The Missourians, enraged at the death of their Colonel, fought
like demons, and, aided by the third Louisiana, sprang into the
ruined fort, and after a severe contest of two or three hours
duration, succeeded in repulsing the enemy with great slaughter.

From our men being very much exposed to the enemy in this
engagement, our loss was not less than eighty-six in killed and
wounded ; a very heavy list of casualties, for the small number
of men engaged on our side. So close were the enemy to our
men during the fight, that they could have conversed in a low
tone with one another. Brigadier General Hebert was himself
present during this engagement, and acted with his usual cool-
ness and intrepidity.

The loss of the enemy could not have been less than four hun-
dred in killed and wounded, as they lay in large numbers before
our works after the fight, and a large number of wounded men
were taken from the field as they fell. So severely punished
were they in this attack, that in the second attempt they made
to blow up the remainder of this fort, they did not try to storm
the line.

While this struggle was going on, no demonstrations were
made on any other portion of the line, beyond the accustomed
amount of shellin^aji^jsj^rpshooting. Rumors of a speedy
relief to the garrlsan w^e^K^ spread among the troops, but
from all the past reports proving false, the soldiers had begun to

x ( «,"?"» ) 5689^

52 THE SIEGE OF VICKgBTJJUS.

doubt everything they hear'c^ leaving it for time to tlecide wheth-
er they should be relieved or not.

; AFTER XXV.

DEATH OF GEX. GREEX, OF MISSOURI. RUM GEN.

JOHNSTON'S ADVANCE.

Two or three days after the destruction of our worts by the.
explosion of the enemy's mine, an event of a most melancholy
nature transpired. Brigadier General Green, commanding a
brigade of Missourians and Arkansinns, in Bowen's division*
was shot in the neck by a Mjirie ball, while in conversation with
his staff. Although medical aid was promptly given to him, it
was of no avail ; his wound Avas mortal, and after lingering for
about an hour he expired. .

Gen. Green wa<s an aged man, esteemed by all who knew him
for his unswerving devotion to the great cause for which he
fell fighting, his intrepid valor, and his genial and amiable qual-
ities. Ke was a quiet and unassuming man ; all the unnecessary
pomp and dignity of the high position he occupied wTere laid
aside, and the meanest private in his command had free and un-
interrupted access to his presence. So endeared was he to his
men, that they looked upon him more in the light of a friend
than that of a G-eneral, Many noble sons of Missouri have fal-
len in this struggle for independence, bravely fighting for their
homes and firesides, now in possession of the foe, but none of
her martyrs in this holy cause will be deserving of greater praise,,
or spoken of in more glowing terms, than the aged and patri-
otic ; General Green. We were told that he wished,
ith, that he would not live to see the city sur-
rendered. If such was Iris wish, he was gratified, for the fatal
ball, that ended his career on earth, came just four days before
the offer was niade^o yield Vieksburg to the ieuemy.

Xo event of any importance transpire-': from this day to the
twenty-ninth of June. The army and the citizens had alinost
despaired .of ever seeing Johnston arrive. The couriers who
ran the gauntlet through the enemy's lines, and arrived safely
in Vieksburg, brought the most exaggerated reports possible of
the strength and position of the army soon to march to our re-
lief. They stated that Gen. Johnston's force was not less than
from fifty to sixty thousand strong, and were stretched from
Jackson to Canton, Mississippi. With these reports, the people
and garrison in general were surprised at his not making an ad-
vance on the enemy, as they felt certain that •. his force was as-

THE SIE>E OF VICKSBUR^. 53

.-strong as represented, there would be no difficulty in defeating
any army the enemy could possibly send against him.

At this period, some unprincipled persons, actuated no doubt
by animosity against General Johnston, spread a report in our
lines, that it was not his intention to relieve the garrison, as he
bad given Lieutenant General Pembertoii orders to evacuate the
city, which order not being obeyed, if ho (Johnston) came to
the relief of the beleagured array and succeeded in raising the
siege, it would compromise his reputation as a commander and
an officer. Such being the case, tho garrison would not l>c re-
lieved, and Vicksbun* would be left to her fate.

These reports, coming to the ears of the soldiers, caused some
feeling of anger against General Johnson for a short time. All
doubts of his desire or intention to aid them were soon laid
aside, however, by tho reports given to the men by tho enemy's
pickets, and they determined to patiently await his arrival, be-
ing certain that as soon as he had organized a sufficiently large
force, he would march to Vicksburg and raise tho siege.

Among the many false reports brought into our line, was one
which stated that Major General Loring had crossed tho Big
Black at Hankersoa's Ferry, and was advancing towards Vicks-
burg, when he was met by an overwhelming force of the enemy.
A severe engagement was then said to have ensued, in which
General Loring was repulsed and compelled to fall back. After
retreating for some distance, he was reinforced by Major Gen-
eral Breckinridge's division, and, making a stand the next day,
fought a severe battle, routing the eneaiy and intlioting great
slaughter on him, and capturing six thousand prisoners.

We make mention of these reports to show the deceptions
practised on the men, although the statement narrated above
was given by the enemy, so far as it relates to the repulse of
Loring, but they said nothing about the subsequent defeat of
their army. As may be supposed, these reports, cheering the
men as they did, when contradicted, did not tend to lighten the
sufferings of the men, or relieve the anxiety which ali felt* for
the advent of succor.

The brave men, nevertheless, still continued to bear up cheer-
fully against the hardships and sufferings they were then endu-
ring, and there were but few who expressed any fear of our
ability to hold the city, or who grew doubtful of final success.

54 THE SIE6E OF VICKSBUHG.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SECOND EXPLOSION OF THE ENEMY'S MINE, AND OCCU-
PATION OF A PORTION OF THE FORT— THE GARRISON
REDUCED TO MULE MEAT.

After the explosion of their mine, on the 25th of June, and
the partial destruction of the fort, the enemy set vigorously to
work on a new mine, for the purpose of completing its destruc-
tion; and, having gotten everything in readiness, on the 1.0th
of June, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, a second explosion
took place, from which the enemy succeeded in destroying the
remnant left standing. No effort was made to storm the works
in the rear of the ruins, although several of our men were killed
and wounded, either by the fragments of dirt, or by the explo-
sion.

The third Louisiana regiment, which occupied this line
throughout the siege, suffered more than any other body of men
in the garrison. Several times their position was charged in the
most desperate manner, and twice was it blown up by the ene-
my. The loss they sustained during the siege, was not far from
two hundred out of about four hundred and fifty contained in
the regiment when the siege commenced. This was a fearful
loss, when we consider it with that of the other commands.

In spite of the exposed position they occupied, these men,
heroes of Belmont, Oak Hill, Elk Horn and Corinth, stood up
manfully to their posts, and held their position against every
effort of the enemy to force their line. We make particular
mention of this regiment without disparagement to any other
of the commands, as all fought with a valor unsurpassed in the
annals of war, but merely as an act of justice to a gallant body
of men, the survivors of what was once a regiment nearly
twelve hundred strong ; and in giving them this praise, we but
echo the opinion of every soldier in the Confederate army, who
has seen them in battle.

The firing from the peninsula, with mortars and siege guns on
Vicksburg, had meanwhile continued with violence. Additional
guns were brought to bear upon the devoted city, making it
almost untenable. Starvation, in its worst forms, now con-
fronted the unfortunate inhabitants, and, had the siege lasted
two weeks longer, the consequences would have been terrible.
All the beef in the city was exhausted by this time, and mules
were soon brought in requisition, and their meat sold readily at
one dollar per pound, the citizens being as anxious to get it, as
they were before the investment, to purchase the delicacies of
the season. It was also distributed among the soldiers, to those
who desired it, although it was not given out under the name
of rations. A great many of them, however, accepted it in

THE SIEGE OP VICKSBUEG. 55

preference to doing without any meat, and the flesh of the mules
was found equal to the best venison. The author of this work
partook of mule meat for three or four days, and found the
flesh tender and nutritious, and, under the peculiar circum-
stances, a most desirable description of food.

CHAPTER XXVII.

SHELLING OF OUR HOSPITALS— CASUALTIES AMONG OUR

OFFICERS

During the siege, the enemy, forgetful of, or disregarding all
rules of civilized warfare, exhibited a refinement of cruelty in
firing at our hospitals. There were between four and five thou-
sand sick and wounded soldiers in the different hospitals in
Vicksburg, over each of which the usual yellow flag floated to
designate that they were hospitals. Without appearing to care
whether they were or not, the enemy deliberately fired into
them, killing and wounding several of the unfortunate beings,
whose ill-luck it was to be quartered there for medical treat-
ment. That this barbarous act was committed intendedly, was
apparent when the Washington Hotel, which had been con-
verted into one of the hospitals, in fall view of the enemy, on
the banks of the river, was struck by a twelve-inch mortar.
Humanity would scarcely feel inclined to believe that an act so
fiendish could be perpetrated by men calling themselves civil-
ized beings, but such was the case, and this conduct must for-
ever remain a reproach upon the nation or people who could
sanction such brutal behavior.

We have not been able to learn whether Lieutenant General
Pemberton ever protested against the shelling of our hospitals,
or remonstrated with General Grant at permitting it ; if he did,
no regard was paid to his complaint, as they continued their
barbarity until the end of the siege. After the surrender of
the city, the Federal officers, in explanation, and as an apology
for their conduct, stated that the guns on the peninsria were
manned by raw troops, and served the double purpose of an-
noying the city and practising the men, but that General Grant
never countenanced, or gave his consent to the hospitals being
shelled.

From the commencement of the siege to the time we write of,
many noble and gallant officers had yielded their life in Jefense
of their country. Among those killed were Colonel Herrick, of
the 21st Louisiana; Lieutenant Colonel Rogers, of the 17th
Louisiana; Major Hoadhy, of the heavy Artillery; Colonel

56 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUSG.

Garrett, of the 20th Alabama; Major Martin, of the 26th Lou-
isiana ; Brigadier General Green, of Missouri ; Colonel Eugene
Erwin, of the 6th Missouri, and others. Among the wounded
were Colonel W. Hall, of the 26th Louisiana; Colonel Patton,
of the 2 8d Louisiana; Colonel Marks, of tho 27th Louisiana,
(since dead) ; and Brigadier General Baldwin, of Smith's divi-
sion. There were, unfortunately, many others killed and wound-
ed during tho siege, who belonged to the field and staff, but
their names, with those of the many hundreds of gallant spirits
who fell in defense of tho " Gibraltar of the South," could not
be obtained; but though the world may never know their names,
the eilent voice of Freedom, more eloquent than all the praise we
can bestow, will bless the memory of those who fell bravely
fighting in a just cause, and a grateful nation will long mourn
her unknown defenders who fell at their post of duty* with their
face to their foe, fighting heroically.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

SEALING OF THE FATE OF VICKSBURQ-OFFER TO SURREN-
DER-INDIGNATION OF THE GARRISON.

No attempt was made to storm our works, or no demonstra-
tion made by the enemy, with their mines, from the twenty-
ninth of June to the surrender of the city, although the same
heavy carnonading and sharpshooting was kept up, until an ar-
mistice was requested by Lieutenant General Pemberton.

Several nights prior to the surrender of the city, the enemy's
piekets told our men that preparations were being made to
storm our works on the fourth of July, as Grant had determin-
ed to sup in Vicksburg on that night, or sup in h — 1, to which
remark one of our pickets replied, that as there was no chance
of Grant's supping in Yicksburg on the fourth of July, it was
very likely he would sup in the latter place. Not a man had
the least idea that the city would be yielded up to the enemy
on that day, all of them thinking that when the worse came
we would cut our way out of the city. To cut our way out,
however, was utterly impracticable. Our men were so weak
and exhausted from the want of a sufficiency of food, that such
an attempt would have resulted in the annihilation of the entire
army, as we do not believe that out of the eighteen thousand
men reported for duty, three thousand could have succeeded in
reaching Big Black safely. This was evidently the opinion of
Lieutenant General Pemberton and his subordinate Generals, and
the surrender of the city was made. That surrendering was

THE SIEGE OF VICK3BTTRG. 5<7

the best course to be adopted we will acknowledge, but that ve
should have surrendered then is what we do notbelieve, if the
statements made in defense of General Pemberton be true —
We will, however, refer to. this in another chanter.

On Friday, the third of July, at about ten o'clock in the morn-
ing, a flag of truce was hoisted on the Jackson road and hostili-
ties ceased. A short time afterwards General Bowen and Col
Montgomery, aid to General Pemberton, were scon leaving the
works for the enemy's lines. As soon as they left the men°con-
jectured that the object of their visit was to treat for a surren-
der of the citT. The excitement among the men soon became
alarming, until it was allayed by a statement that General Pem-
berton had sent to General Grant for the purpose of getting his
consent to our removing the siek and wounded and the women
and children from the city.

After remaining in the enemy's line for some time, General
Bowen and Colonel Montgomery returned, when icial

correspondence in the next chapter took place.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENS. PEMBERTQN
AND GRANT. SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG MADE.

This chapter contains the official correspondence of Generals
1 emberton and Grant, which we copy from the United States pa-
pers. We give it so as to complete as much as possible this work

General Pemberton '$ Letter proposing the Surrender of Vicks-

burg.
Headquarters, Vicksbi-rg, July 3, 18G3.
Maj. Gen. XL S. Grakt, Commanding United States forces.

General : I have the honor to present to you an armistice for
— hours with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation
of \icksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint
three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by
yourseit, at such place and hour to-day as you mav find conve-
nient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of
blood, winch must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feel-
ing myself fally able to maintain mv position for a yet indefinite
period.

This communication will be handed you un
by Major General James Bow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J.- C. Pembe

THE SIEGE OP VICKSBURG.

To this General Grant replied as follows :

General Grants Reply.

Headquarters Dep't of Texness >:••:,
In the Field, near Vicksburg, July 3, 1863.

Lieut. Gen. J. C. Pemberton, commanding Confederate forces,
. etc.

General: Your note of this date, just received v proposes an
armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms
of capitulation, through commissioners to be appointed, etc.
The effusion of blood you propose stopping by this source can
be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional sur-
render of the garrison- Men who have shown so much endu-
rance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always chal-
lenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be
treated with all the respect due them as prisoners of war. I do
not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange
terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those
indicated above.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant, Major General.

Gen. Bo wen, the bearer of Gen. Pemberton's letter, was re-
ceived by Gen. A. J. Smith. He expressed a strong desire to
converse with Gen. Grant, and accordingly, while declining this,
Gen. Grant requested Gen. Smith to say, that if Gen. Pembef-
ton desired to see him, an interview would be granted between
the lines, in McPherson's front, at any hour in the afternoon
which Gen. Pemberton might appoint.

A message was sent back to Gen. Smith appointing three
o'clock as the hour. General Grant was there with his staff, and
Gens. Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith. Gen. Pember-
ton came late, attended by Gen. Bowen and Col. Montgomery.
He was much excited and impertinent in his answers to General
Grant. The conversation was held apart, between Gen. Pem-
berton and his officers, and Gens. Grant, McPherson and A. J,
Smith. The rebels insisted on being paroled, and allowed to
march beyond our lines ; officers and men all with eight days'
rations, drawn from their own stores, the*officers;to retain their
private property and body servants.

Gen. Grant heard what they had to say, and left them at the
end of an hour and a half, saying he would send in his ultimat-
um in writing, to which Gen. Pemberton promised to reply be-
fore night, hostilities to cease in the meantime.

Gen. Grant then conferred at his headquarters with his corps
and divison commanders, and sent the following letter to Gen.
Pemberton by the hand of General Logan and Lieutenant Colo-
nel Wilson :

THE SIEGE OF VICRSBUEG. 59

General Grant's offer for the Surrender.

Headquarters, Department op Tennessee, )
Xear Vicksburg, July 3, 1863. \

Lieut. Gen. J. C. Pemberton, Commanding Confederate forces,
Vicksburg, Miss.

General: In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon,
I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the
City of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the
terms proposed, I will march in one division, as a guard, and
take possession at eight o'clock to-morrow morning. As soon
as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men,
you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers tak-
ing with them their regimental clothing, and staff, field and
cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allow-
ed all their clothing, but no other property.

If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you
may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have,
and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them ;
thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as
one. You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot
be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all
sick and wounded officers and privates,! as fast as they become
able to travel. The paroles of these latter must be signed, how-
ever, whilst officers are present, authorized to sign the roll of
prisoners. I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant, Major General.

The officers who received this letter stated that it would be
impossible to answer it by night, and it was not till a little be-
fore peep-cf-day that the proposed reply was furnished.

Reply of Gen. Pemberton, accepting all the terms offered by
General Gra-nt.

Headquarters, Vicksburg, July 3.

Maj. Gen. IT. S. Grant, Commanding United States Forces.

General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this date, proposing terms for the surrender
of this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accept-
ed ; but in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops,
manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have the honor to
submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you,
will perfect the agreement between us : At ten o'clock to-mor-
row I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg,
and to surrender the city and garrison under my command by
marching out with my colors and arms and stacking them in
front of my present limits, after which you will take possession ;

€0 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

officers to retain their side arms and personal property, and the
rights and property of citizens to be respected.

I am, General, yours, very respectfully,

J. C. Pemberton, Lieutenant General.

To this General Grant immediately replied as follows:

Headquarters Department of Tennessee, [
Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. \

Lieutenant General Peitberton, commanding forces in Vicks-
burg :

General : I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of the 3d of July. The amendments proposed by you can*
not be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every
officer and man with a parole signed by myself, which, with the
completion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some
time. Again : I can make no stipulation with regard to the
treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do
not propose to cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss,
I cannot consent to leave myself under restraint by stipulations.
The property which officers can be allowed to take with them,
will be as stated in the proposition of last evening — that is, that
officers will be allowed their private baggage and side arms, and
mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your prop-
ositions for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now
occupied by it, and stack their arms at ten o'clock, A. M., and
then return to the inside and remain as prisoners until properly
paroled, I will make no objections to it. Should no modifica-
tion be made of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock,
A. ]VL, I shall regard them as having been rejected, and act ac-
cordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags will be
displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may
not have been notified from firing on your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant,
Major General United States Army.

To this the subjoined answer has this moment been received:
Unconditional Acceptance by General Pemberton, of the terms
Proposed by General Grant.

Headquarters, Vicksburg, )
July 4, 1863. \
Major General U. S. Gra>t, commanding United States forces,
etc.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this date, and in reply, to say that the terms
proposed by you are accepted. Very respectfully,

J. C. Pemberton, Lieutenant General.

'HE SIEGE OF VICK9BUBG. CI

CHAPTER XXX.

SURRENDER OF VICK3BURG AND GARRISON— TERMS OF

::ITULATIOX— LAYING DOWN OF THE ARMS.

tt three o'clock in the afternoon of the third of Jul?,
Lieutenant General Pemberton, accompanied by Major General
Bo wen, left our lines and proceeded to the neutral ground, pre-
viously designated, and had an interview with General Grant.
suit of their conference wo have already given in the
! correspondence. After an absence of about two hours'
duration, Lieutenant General Pemborton and Major General
Bo wen returned into our lines. As an armistice had been de-
clared until ten o'clock that evening, the firing ceased, and the
shades of night descended upon the two opposing armies in
quietude, unbroken, save by the voices of the soldiers in low but
angry and indignant conversation, at what they deemed a dis-
grace upon their country in surrendering the city they had so long
and nobly fought, and endured the pangs of hunger to defend.

At dark, en the evening of this day, a council of all the Gen-
erals was held at General Pemberton's headquarters, which
lasted for several hours. Although we could not learn what
transpired in an official way, we received information, from <^ood
authority, that it was decided, by a majority of tho general
officers, that the troops were entirely too weak from the want
of food to cut their way through, and that if the position had
to be yielded, it was useless to sacrifice tho lives of the men in
a fruitless endeavor; so that the only course left was to surren-
der the garrison on General Grant's terms of capitulation. Of
the Major Generals present, we understand that Major General
M. L. Smith was the only one who absolutely opposed surren-
dering on any condition, preferring to remain behind the breast-
works and starve rather than give up the city. A majority of
the council, being of a contrary opinion to him, however; he
was, of course, necessitated to abide by their decision, and
about three o'clock a messenger was sent into G rant's

lines with dispatches from Lieutenant General Pemberton.

On Saturday morning, a circular v. id from headquar-

ters, announcing the surrender of Vicksburg and garrison, and
stating the terms of capitulation to be as follows :

1st. The entire garrison of Confederate troops was to be sur-
rendered to Major .General Grant, commanding the Lmited
States forces.

. 2d. The prisoners of war were to be paroled and sent out of
the city as soon as blank paroles were printed.

3d. All mounted officers to have the privilege of retaining
their horses.

62 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

4th. All officers of every grade and rank were to retain their
side arms, &c.

5th. All citizens desiring to leave the city with the Confed-
erate forces, could do so on being paroled.

6th. All ammunition, stores, field artillery and siege guns,
were to be surrendered to the United States forces, as also all
small arms in our possession.

These are about the substance of the terms of capitulation.
Although we made no copy of Lieutenant General Pemberton's
circular, this will be found as correct a statement as could be
desired.

"When it was officially announced to our men that Vicksburg
was surrendered to the enemy, their indignation knew no
bounds. Having been among the troops, we can truthfully
speak what we heard and saw of the expressions of sentiment
on their part relative to the surrender. With almost an unani-
mous voice the soldiers declared that General Pemberton had
yielded the city without their will, and against any desire on
their part. All expressed a determination never to serve under
him again, many stating, that rather than be under the command
of such a man, they would desert from the army, if they were
afterwards shot for it. It is not to be denied that the feeling
among the men amounted almost to a mutinous one — to such
a degree, indeed, was it, that many threats were made, which
only the argument and supplication of the officers prevented the
men from putting into execution.

All the statements we have made above in reference to the
feelings of the soldiers are truth— every word truth, and in sub-
stantiation of them, we call upon the soldiers and officers com-
posing the garrison of Vicksburg, to vouch for all we have
said.

On Saturday morning, the fourth of July, and the anniversary
of American Independence, the troops composing the army of
Lieutenant General Pemberton marched from the line of in-
trenchments they had defended and held for nearly two months,
amid hardships and privations unsurpassed in the annals of
modern warfare, and after stacking the arms they had so well
and nobly used, and lowering the standards which had proudly
floated on many a bloody battle-field, returned inside the works,
prisoners of war to their bitterest foe.

THE SrEGE OF TICKSBXTEG. 63

CHAPTER XXXI.

OCCUPATION OF VICKSBURG BY THE ENEMY. CONDUCT
OF YANKEE SOLDIERS. IMPUDENCE OF NEGROES.

On Saturday, at twelve o'clock, M., Logan's division of Mc-
Pherson's corps, of the Federal army, commenced entering the
city, and in a quarter of an hour Vicksbnrg was crammed with
them. Their first act was to take possession of the court house,
on the spire of which they hoisted the United States flag, amid
the exultant shouts of their comrades, and a deep feeling of
humiliation on the part of the Confederate soldiers who witness-
ed the hauling up of the nag which they had hoped never to see,
floating over the city they had so long and proudly boasted im-
pregnable, and never to be taken by the enemy of the South.

After the enemy's forces had stacked their arms, they scat-
tered over the city, and then commenced a scene of pillage and
action which beggars all description. Houses and stores
were broken open, and their contents appropriated by the plun-
<. The amount of money and property stolen in this way
was enormous, and the Yankee soldiers appeared to glory in
their vandalism. One merchant, by the name of G. C. Kress,
had his safe bioken open, and twenty thousand dollars in money,
with a large supply of clothing, taken away. Another merchant,
and well-known citizen of Mississippi, by the name of W. II.
Stephens, had his store broken open and nearly all the contents
taken away. In fact, every place that they could possibly enter
without fear of resistance, was broken open and robbed of what
was contained in them. The enemy appeared to glory in their
course, and on one occasion, in reply to a remonstrance on the
part of a gentleman <vhose residence they had broken open, they
said, " we have fought hard enough to capture Vicksbnrg, and
now we have got it, we intend to plunder every house in the
d — d rebel city."

As soon as Gen. Grant heard of the wholesale pillage of the
city that his followers had commenced, he ordered guards to be
stationed over the town, and issued an order prohibiting any of
his men from entering any other residence than that in which
they were quartered, and threatening to punish any soldier who
might be caught in the act of robbing citizens ; at the same
time he gave no satisfaction whatever, to those parties who had
already suffered at the hands of his army. Several applications
were made to him for redress, but he told the applicants he was
unable to assist them, or give any permission to have the camps
of the men searched ; although, if any of his soldiers were dis-
covered with stolen property in their posssession, he would have
if- returned to their owners, on their proving it belonged to
tii em. This was, of course, but poor consolation to the losers

04 TEE SIEGE OP VIOKSBUBG.

who were necessitated to be satisfied with this answer, and sub-
mit to their loss. * *

With that enterprise and greed for gain which characterizes
the universal Yankee nation, on the same day that the Federal
army entered Yieksburg, several places of business were opened,,
and signs informing the public that metalic coffins wero on hand
to remove the dead bodies of friends, and that express offices,
book and fruit stores were " within," were to bo seen upon sev-
eral establishments on Washington street.

Soon after the enemy entered the city, Mr. William. Lum, a
w ell-known citizen of Yieksburg, took tie oath of allegiance,
and General Grant made his headcpaarters at the residence of
this gentleman. The Jewish portion of the population, com-
posed principally of Germans, with but one honorable exception,
went forward and received the oath of allegiance to the United
States. The one honorable exception sacrificed a store of goods,
which cost him between thirty8five and forty thousand dollars,
rather than remain under the control of the enemy.

The conduct of the negroes, after the entrance of their " lib-
erators," was beyond all expression. While the Yankee army
was marching through the streets, crowds of them congregated
on the sidewalks, with a broad grin of satisfaction on their ebony
countenances. The next day, which was Sunday, witnessed a
sight, which would have been ludicrous had it not galled our
soldiers by the reflection that they were compelled to submit to
it. There was a great turn out of the u contrabands," dressed
up in the most extravagant style imaginable, and promenading
through the streets, as if Vicksburg had been confiscated and
turned over them. In familiar conversation with the negro
wenches, the soldiers of the Federal army were seen, arm-in-
arm, marching through the streets, while the " bucks"" congre-
gated on the corners and discussed the happy event that had
■ht them free1

$o arrogant did the negroes become after the entrance of the
Federal forces, that no white Confederate citizen or soldier dared
to speak to them, for fear of being called a rebel, or some other
abusive epithet. One of the Confederate soldiers, happening to
enter the garden of the house that the author of this work re-
sided in, for tlie purpose of picking a peach, a negro, belonging
to a gentleman of Yieksburg, who had charge of the garden,
brought out a gun, and, taking deliberate aim at the soldier,
was about to fire. We immediately threw up the gun, and,
drawing a knife, threatened the negro if he fired at the man ;
no sooner was the threat made, than the negro, with an oath,
levelled the gun at us and drew the trigger ; luckily the cap
snapped without exploding, and we succeeded in getting the
gun away and discharging it.

While making these observations about the negroes, we would
say that it was confined to the city negroes aloae. The slaves

THE SIEGE OF VICK8BUEG. o5

brought in by planters, and servants of soldiers and officers, did
not appear the least gratified at their freedom. The majority
of those connected with our army were very desirous of leav-
ing with their masters, and General Grant at first consented
that those who desired it should leave ; but as soon as a few
passes were made out, he revoked the order, and compelled the
balance to remain. These differences in the conduct of city and
country negroes, should not be a matter of surprise, when we
consider the privileges given to the negroes in the cities of the
South, and demands a change of policy on the part of slave-
owners residing in densely populated places. Many of the ne-
groes, who were compelled to remain in Vicksburg when their
masters in the army left, afterwards made their escape, and re-
turned to the Confederate linos.

CHAPTER XXXII.

BOSS DURING THE SIEGE. NUMBER OF CONFEDERATE*
CAPTURED. ARMS AND AMMUNITION SURREN-
DERED. OPINIONS OF THE ENEMY.

The loss of the Confederate forces during the siege, is esti-
mated by good judges at a number not exceeding 4,000 in killed
and wounded. A number of our casualties resulted from the
indiscretion of the soldiers in exposing themselves to the ene-
my's sharpshooters. The loss of the enemy we would estimate
as follows:

Attack on Shoup's line, 19th of May, 600 killed and wounded.

General assault on the 22d May 9,000 " u

Attack on Hebert's line, 25th June. . 600 "

Prisoners captured 500

Other casualties during the siege.. . . 2,000

Making a total of 12,700

This estimate we believe to -be much beneath what it really
was, as in our opinion the enemy lost; nearly as much as the
total, ou the twenty-second of May, for, taking the ratio of six
men wounded for one killed, we find that as many as two thou-
sand dead bodies were buried by the enemy on the Monday
following. This would make their loss on that day alone 14,000,
or more than the grand total we give above. The assertion of
Grant, in his official report, that he lost only 8,000 men during
the campaign, is ar glaring falsehood, as we feel certain that on
-the day mentioned above he lost more than he states his casu-
5

C6 THE SIEGE OF Y1CK8BUKG.

alties to be from the landing at Bruinsburg to the surrenderor
the city.

The total amount of prisoners captured at Vicksburg by the
enemy did not exceed twenty-four thousand, of which, nearly
six thousand were either sick <3r wounded. The following gen-
eral officers were captured enant General Pemberton ;
Major Generals M. L. Smith, J. II. Forney, J. Bowen, and C. L.
Stephenson. The names of the Brigadier Generals captured
were: Ilebert, Moore, Barton, Lee, Buford, Shonp, Baldwin,
Vaughn and Taylor ; the latter being Inspector General of the
army.

Our loss in small arms -ami artilledry was about as follows :

Small Arms .' 35,000

Siege Guns 27

Field Artillery. 70

A great many pieces of the artillery were unfit for use, and
could have been of no use to the enemy.

The amount of ammunition delivered over to the Yankee offi
cers was large, and as near as we could find out, was as follows"

Musket Cartridges 600,000 rounds.

Field Artillery Cartridges 15,000 "

Heavy Artillery Cartridges 15,000 "

Percussion Caps 350,000

This estimate we believe very moderate, as it only gives for
each man thirty-five rounds of musket cartridges, and about
twenty percussion caps each. We are quite certain that a con-
siderably larger amount of ammunition was surrendered to the
enemy. This estimate, however, is made to avoid all charges
of exaggeration.

Our line of works was pronounced by the enemy's engineer
officers to be the most contemptible they had seen erected du-
ring the war. All expressed great astonishment that, with fif-
teen months of time before us, we had not converted Vicks-
burg into an impregnable fortress. They expressed themselves
very much deceived in the strength of our works, as the repre-
sentations of the Northern press, and our own boasting, had
made them believe that Vicksburg was defended by well made
works, and had .between two and* three hundred guns mounted.

Our works were, indeed, the most outrageous ever made
during the war. The supervisors of their construction could-
have known no more about erecting fortifications than we do ;.
in fact, there was not one engineer in the army of Vicksburg
who understood his profession thoroughly — they existed but in
name, and the position they held in the Confederate service.
The ground on which the works were erected was naturally a
strong one, and to that advantage alone were we enabled to
hold the city for so long a time, otherwise they would have

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUKG. 67

offered but little or no impediment to the overwhelming num-
bers of the enemy which were thrown on the line in their attack
on the twenty-second of May.

After the enemy had taken possession of Vicksburg, Major
General McPherson rode over the entire length of the line, and
was so impressed with the defective manner in which they were
constructed, that he is reported to have exclaimed : " Good
Heavens ! are these the long-boasted fortifications of Vicksburg?
It was the rebel*, and not their works, that kept us out of the
city." While this was a great compliment to the valor of the
" rebels," it certainly expressed the greatest contempt possible
for the fortifications surrounding Vicksburg.

The Federal officers candidly -gave the Confederate garrison
the credit of being as brave troops as they ever saw, and more
than one compliment to the heroism of our soldiers was paid,
coupled with a regret on the part of the officers of rank, that
such men should be in arms against the United States. Xot a
word was said by the Yankees claiming superiority in fighting
qualities ; they all acknowledged that starvation had conquered
us, and not the prowess of their arms, and during the stay of
the garrison in Vicksburg, the greatest courtesy and considera-
tion was shown to our soldiers by the Federal officers ; their
privates alone manifesting any desire to gloat over our reverse.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

A WEEK IN THE ENEMY'S LINES. PAROLING THE GARRI-
SON. DEPARTURE FROM VICKSBURG.

The Confederate army remained in Vicksburg, as prisoners
of war, for one week after the surrender, that time being taken
to prepare the rolls of the different commands, and parole the
men. During this period many severe street fights took place
between the Federal and Confederate soldiers, in consequence
of the taunts and abuse of the victorious army. Several of the
Federal soldiers were severely beaten, and One or two killed.
In one of these street brawls, a young man, a citizen of Vicks-
burg, and volunteer aid on Gen. Baldwin's staff, shot a Federal
soldier dead for using insulting language. He was taken to
General Grant's headquarters, and after a hearing released.

During the week spent in the enemy's lines, we had several
opportunities of hearing the sentiments of both the officers and
soldiers of the Federal army. Among the officers, it was the
same everlasting cant about the Union, and their determi-
nation that it should be restored ; but among the privates the

68 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

greed for gaiu, and the object with which they figkt was not
concealed in the slightest degree. They spoke in raptures of
the capacity of Mississippi's soil for white labor, and declared
their intention to get a grant of land from the United States,
and settle there after the war is over. This unblushing decla-
ration was accompanied by the assertion that, as the South had
rebelled against their government, it was only just that the pro-
perty of the people should be divided among their troops. Such
remarks were the principal causes of the street fights between
the two armies, as the high spirit of our soldiers could ill brook
this style of apportioning their homes and property by the
enemy.

By Friday, the 10th of July, the prisoners having been pa-
roled, orders were issued to the different brigade commanders
to make preparations for marching the next morning, and ac-
cordingly the troops were got in readiness for their departure.

On Saturday morning, at half-past eleven o'clock, the Confed-
erate soldiers took up their line of march. It was a mournful
and harrowing sight. The soldiers felt their disgrace, and there
was not one gallant heart in the mass of men, that did not feet
half bursting with sorrow and humiliation at being compelled
to march through the enemy's guards who were stationed on
both sides of the road to some distance beyond the entrench-
ments. But nothing could avert the degradation; so with
downcast looks, and countenances on which a knowledge of the
bitterness of their defeat could be seen plainly stamped, they
filed past the enemy, who gathered in large numbers to witness
their departure.

It was a day never to be forgotten by those who assisted in
the defense of Vicksburg. So filled with emotion were many
of our men, that large tear drops could be. seen on their weath-
er-beaten countenances, and ever and anon they would pause in
their march, and, turning back, take one last sad look at the
city they had fought and bled for. All felt that, serious as the
disaster was to the Confederate cause, it was nothing to their
humiliation. Amid the storm of shot and shell that poured
upon them, they had remained cheerful and confident ; but at
this moment their hopefulness had departed ; the yell of defi-
ance that had so often struck terror in the hearts of their foe,
was not to be heard ; their willing hands no longer grasped the
weapons of a good cause ; their standards trailed in the dust,
and they were prisoners of war. Silently and sadly they
marched on, and in a few minutes Vicksburg was lost to their
view.

Thus fell the city of Vicksburg after a defense of over twelve
months, and a siege which lasted for forty-seven days, forty-two
of which a garrison of not more than twenty-five thousand ef-
fective men had subsisted on less than one-quarter rations. The
Confederate army fought with a valor that not even the defend-

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 69

ers of Saraggossa and Mantua ever surpassed. Subject to a
bombardment of a nature so terrific that its equal has never
been known in civilized warfare ; through rain and sunshine,
storm and calm, writhing under the pangs of starvation, these
gallant Southern troops, whose deeds will form one of history's
brightest pages when the annals of this siege shall become
known, stood up to their post, and, with almost superhuman
valor, repulsed every attack made by their enemy, and inflicting
tremendous loss on him, until surrendered by the General whose
want of ability and confidence in himself had entailed these suf-
ferings and hardships on them.

It is estimated that the number of missiles thrown in the en-
trenchments, exceeded thirty thousand daily ; and by the offi-
cial report of General Grant's Chief of Artillery, it would ap-
pear that twenty millions three hundred and seventy thousand
one hundred and twenty-two missiles of all kinds were thrown
in the works, which would make it, by calculation, over four
hundred thousand missiles, including small arm ammunition,
daily thrown. This, however, must be an exaggeration, unless
Grant's Chief of Artillery included the number of rounds of
small arms used in the different battles prior to the investment
of Vicksburg, which lasted only forty-seven days. He, how-
ever, gives the number as having been fired into the city, which,
if correct, would only show the gigantic nature of the bom-
bardment. The number of shots from artillery are averaged, by
the Chief of Artillery for Grant's army, at 32,617 per day ; but
then he only gives 142,912 rounds as having been fired during
the entire siege. It is very likely that an error exists in the
last estimators more than that number was fired. We are ra-
ther inclined to think the number should have been 1,420,912,
as that would bring it nearer to his daily estimate.

We cannot closethis chapter without passing a just compli-
ment to the Surgeons attached to the garrison of Vicksburg.
Although they were from morning to night engaged in their
duties to the soldiers, they were always found administering to
the sick and wounded non-combatants of the city. Among the
many, we must mention Dr. E. McD. Coffey, Chief Surgeon of
Bowen's division, who was unremitting in his attentions to this
class of sufferers, and always had several sick and wounded wo-
men and children under his charge. To this gentleman we
were indebted for an introduction to Major General McPher-
son, who is, without doubt, the only real gentleman among the
Federal Generals to whom we were introduced. He was very
polite, never using the epithet "rebel" in the presence of our
officers or soldiers, and avoided, as much as possible, any ex-
pression of exultation at the fall of Vicksburg when in our
company.

Before bringing this chapter to a close, we would endeavor
to remove til ir people, that Vicksburg was

70 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

surrendered after a feeble defense. The city was defended as
desperately as could be required. The only thing to be said is,
that had proper generalship been displayed, there would have
been no necessity to use the works surrounding Vicksburg.
After we were invested, the defense of Vicksburg commenced,
and though the city is now in the hands of the enemy, it has
brought him no honor in its capture, nor added a single laurel
to his wreath of victory. Starvation succeeded in doing what
the prowess of their arms could never have performed. The
result was a reverse to the Confederate arms ; but when future
generations shall speak of this war, the deeds of the gallant
men who defended the city, will be extolled among the most he-
roic feats of the war, and the descendants of those who fought
behind the entrenchments of Vicksburg, will be proud of the
knowledge that their fathers aided in its defense. All honor to
their unswerving patriots ! Nobly did they sustain the honor of
their country, and the glory of their past deeds ; and, falling as
they did, the historian of this war will declare that, in their
fall as much honor was gained as if they had triumphed in their
defense.

• CHAPTER XXXXY.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN, FROM THE LANDING OF THE
ENEMY TO THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

When writers far away from the scene of military operations
attempt to censure the actions of military men, particularly if
not well acquainted with the facts attending such operations,
the voice of censure should be raised in condemnation of such
a course ; but when the case is reversed, and the writer is pres-
ent, and witnesses the short-coinings and errors of a General, it
is a great foliy to charge him with giving to the public opin-
ions of the incompetency of Generals, because he happens not
to be a military-educated man, or to hold no position in the
army. It doe3 not require military talent to decide whether or
not a General is competent ; common sense and a sound judg-
ment, seasoned or strengthened by the opinions of other and
better informed men, are all that is needed to make those ideas
not only able, but in reality truthful and correct.

It is with these opinions that we venture to publish this re-
view of General Pemberton's campaign, from the landing of
the enemy at Bruinsburg to the surrender of Vicksburg. Many
of the comments and criticisms made in these pages, are the re-
sult of strict observation before the investment ; and fears of
what wo deemed errors and signs -of incompetency on the part

THE SIEGE OF VI€KSBTTBG. 71

of Lieutenant General Pernberton, were expressed by us in pri-
vate conversation, some weeks before the enemy had lauded.
Wo had, however, determined not to make thum public, until
they could be confirmed by men of well known military talent,
and high position in the Confederate army. Circumstances
having favored our wishes, special pains were taken to' observe
and note down all the sentiments expressed by those who, from
their standing in the army, are quite capable of judging and of
forming correct ideas.

We were not present in every engagement which we relate ;
but all the accounts given in this work were received from
General officers who were present, and to whose information
we attach importance, as they emanate from soldiers of great
ability and valor. We found, in conversation with many dis-
tinguished officers, that their ideas were identical to ours, and,
strengthened by their sentiment?, we give to the public the
criticisms and comments to be found in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE ERROR IN NOT MASSING OUR ARMY AT GRAND GULF.

As soon as the enemy's fleet had passed our batteries at
Vicksburg, it became apparent that the first point attacked
would be Grand Gulf. The garrison at that place consisted of
two small brigades of Missouri and Arkansas troops under Gen.
Bo wen, with the brigades of Col. Reynolds, of Stephenson's di-
vision, and Brigadier General Baldwin's, of Smith's, in "FMs-
hurg as a reinforcing column. The total number of men in this
force, when combined, could not have been seven thousand ef-
fective men. On the 30th of April, the enemy landed at Bru-
insburg unopposed, and was allowed, from want of troops to
oppose him, to march to Port Gibson, where he met General
Bowen.

Here it was, in the opinion of military men, that Lieutenant
General Pemberton committed an error in not massing his en-
tire army at Grand Gulf, as soon as the enemy's licet had passed
our batteries. From the nature of the country around Bruins-
burg, artillery and sharpshooters posted along the banks of the
river would have effectually prevented the Federal army from
landing at that point, and had they ventured to land lower down
in the vicinity of Rodney, and marched through the country by
of Tabor's Creek to Bayou Pierre for the purpose of getting in
oar rear, the forces under General Johnston, at Jackson, Mi*
sippi, could have been thrown rapidly from Clinton to Utica,

72 THE SIEGE VF VIGKSBUEG. .

Mississippi, and, crossing below where Bayou Pierre branches
off in two bodies, have hemmed in the enemy between them,
and our forces' at Grand Gulf. There would then have been
but twe alternatives left for the enemy : either to fall back in
haste to Rodney, or fight a battle under such disadvantages
that victory would almost have been a certain result to the
Confederate army.

The enemy's entire force at that point did not number more
than forty or fifty thousand men, while our army, under Lieu-
tenant General Pemberton, was about twenty-live thousand,
which, with an addition of ten thousand men, the estimated
strength of General Johnston's army, from Jackson would have
reduced the disparity of numbers sufficiently to give us strong
hopes of victory. We comment, in this way, from the fact,
that if General Bowen, with only seven thousand men, could
have held in check the enemy's entire force for over twenty-four
hours, we think it but reasonable to suppose that our army,
when five times as strong, could have defeated him.

These, however, are but speculations, and granting, from our
limited military experience, that the ideas given above are not
feasible, what prevented Lieut. Gen. Pemberton from throwing
his entire force on the enemy at Port Gibson, and crushing him
before any more troops could have been brought across the
river ? The enemy had but a limited number of transports, and
the time it would have required to convey troops across the
river to reinforce their army, would have been amply sufficient
for our forces to have inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy,
from which he could not have recovered.

The defenders and apologists of General Pemberton's move-
ments, while acknowledging that the best course would have
been to mass our army at Grand Gulf, assert that he was. pre-
vented from so doing by the conflicting opinions of his Major
Generals. It is said by them that General Pemberton's desire
was to fight the battle of Vicksburg at Grand Gulf, but that
Major General Stephenson gave it as his opinion, that the ene-
my would attack the city in front; Major General Forney had
an idea that Snyder's Bluff would be the point of attack, and
Major General Smith expected the enemy to land and attempt
the storming of the works at Chickasaw Bayou. Lieutenant
General Pemberton, it is said, did not share these opinions, but
from an apprehension, if disaster should follow his removing
the troops from Vicksburg, by an attack of the enemy on the
points above named, it would be said that he disregarded the
opinions of his subordinates and brought on the evil, he yielded
to them, and suffered General Bowen to be overpowered at Port
Gibson, and through weakness in numbers, and fears of being
surrounded, to destroy the works at Grand Gulf and evacuate
the place, thus leaving a path open to the enemy through the
State of Mississippi.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 73

Whether this defense be a truthful statement of facts, we
cannot tell, and will not venture to vouch for it, but we give it
so that Lieutenant General Pemberton shall have the benefit of
all the argument and assertions brought forward in his favor.
If, however, this defense is true, we see no way in which it can
aid in removing the responsibility off Gen. Pemberton's shoul-
ders i on the contrary, it shows a weakness and want of confi-
dence in himself, which would alone be proof enough of his in-
competency to command a department of such magnitude and
importance as the one he was in control of.

The statement is, that General Pemberton was in favor of
reinforcing Gen. Bowen, but was overruled in so doing by the
representations of his Major Generals, who entertained opinions
which lie did not share. The question is then natural, when we
ask: who was the commander of the army at Vicksburg? If
General Pemberton had ordered either of his subordinate Gen-
erals to march their divisions, or part of their divisions, to Grand
Gulf, they could not have disobeyed the command, but would
have reinforced Bowen according to the orders received. But
granting that this story is not true, and we have grave doubts
of its reliability, it would seem that some one was at fault in
allowing the other divisions of our army to remain in idleness
at Vicksburg, while Bowen, with only seven thousand men, was
giving battle at Port Gibson to a Yankee army forty thousand
strong.

It has been also said, in defense of Lieutenant General Pem-
berton, that the enemy were making feints upon his position at
Chickasaw Bayou and Snyder's Bluff, and had he reduced his
forces they would have known it, from the numerous spies they
had in Vicksburg. Granting all this argument, we see no rea-
son why General Pemberton could not have learned by the same
source as they derived their information of the strength of our
army, that the movements made by the enemy, were mere feints,
which amounted to nothing, as they had not sufficient men to
make an attack.

In addition to all this mass of argument, it was well known
that the whole Federal army was massing near ISt. Joseph,
Louisiana. Gen. Pemberton had, then, but one of two courses
to pursue: either to prevent their landing at Bruinsburg, or
massing his army 2t Grand Gulf, and giving battle as soon as
they landed. It is absurd to suppose that General Grant, after
landing his army, would have avoided a battle, and marched on
Jackson or Clinton, with the knowledge that a Confederate
force of nearly thirty thousand of the finest fighting men
in the world, could, as soon as he attempted such a move,
have been hurled upon his left flank and rear. "We there-
fore concur in the opinion of not less than seven of Gen.
Pemberton's subordinate Generals, that a grave error was com-
mitted in not massing our army at Grand Gulf, and fighting the
battle of Viteksbvirg at that point.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE ERROR IN REMAINING ON THE WEST BANK OF THE
BIG BLACK.

After the battle of Port Gibson, and evacuation Of Grand
Gulf by General Bowen, the Confederate army fell back to the
West bank of the Big Black, in the vicinity of Bovina, Missis-
sippi, while detachments from it were engaged in watching the
different fords on the river. All the troops on the east bank of
the Big Black were posted on the railroad, as far as Edward's
Depot, about twenty miles from Vicksburg. The strength of
our army at that time could not have been less than from twenty-
three to twenty-six thousand men, well armed and equipped,
and supported by at least sixty pieces of light artillery.

While our army was remaining on the west bank of the Big-
Black, the Federal forces were marching through the State by
way of Cayuga, Raymond and Clinton, with the intention of
driving Johnston across Pearl river,.and thus removing the chance
of his rear being exposed when he marched on Vicksburg. In
making this movement, he detached a small portion of his troops
for the purpose of making a feint on General Pemberton' s forces,
and keeping him on the west bank of the Big Black. Here it
.was, that Lieutenant General Pemberton again allowed himself
to be deceived, and no measures were taken to follow the enemy,
whose rear and flank were now exposed to our forces. The
question at issue is, whether General Pemberton was aware of
Grant's marching on Jackson, Mississippi, or was he ignorant of
the fact. If he was aware of it, we see no way in which he
can defend himself from the charge of displaying a want of
generalship in not pursuing the advantage opened to him, and
attacking the enemy. It is said, in defense of this apathy dis-
played by the Lieutenant General, that he was opposed to cross-
ing the river, his plan being to wait until the enemy had pene-
trated the State, when he would inarch forward and cut him off
from the river, and thus either compel them to fight under great
disadvantage, or starve from want of provisions. This idea is
not feasible, for two reasons : First, because, as soon as Grand
Gulf fell, Vicksburg became our base of operations, which re-
quired that the rear of our army should always be directed to
the city. By making the move his defenders claim he contem-
plated, General Pemberton would have had the rear of his army
to the Mississippi river, and liable to attack at any moment by
reinforcements crossing to succor Grant, besides which Vicks-
burg would have been left exposed, and the enemy by rapidly
marching would have been able to reach the city before we
could, our army not being large enough to be divided so as to
defend Vicksburg at the same time that this move was being

THE SIEGE OF YICKSBURG. 15

made; and secondly, the idea of starving out the enemy was
not feasible, as we have General Grant's official report to certify
that his entire army subsisted on the country for eight days,
and found a plenty of food wherever they went.

It is our opinion that General Pemberton was not aware of
the enemy's marching toward Jackson, and this opinion is shared
with us by officers of high rank. If this opinion is correct, we
are at a loss to understand how a General commanding an army
can remain ignorant of the movements of his adversary, unless
he is incompetent. Did not General Pemberton have his spies ?
Or, why did be not have them ? The country through which
the enemy marched is the most patriotic portion of the Confed-
eracy, and the citizens would have gladly given all the informa-
tion they had of the whereabouts of the enemy.

What excuse can General Pemberton give for permitting
Grant to march unmolested from Grand Gulf to Clinton ? Wo
see none. This alone would be sufficient to prove him incom-
petent to command an army like the one he had control of
Vicksburg. In no other instance, during this war, has such
short sighted Generalship been displayed, and we cannot but
attribute it to a want of military talent. Common sense — com-
mon reason, should convince those desirous of shielding Gen.
Pemberton from censure, that he was out-gen eraled, not by
General Grant's military superiority, but by his own lack of
ability.

It is an acknowledged fact, that the division and brigade
commanders almost unanimously favored an advance of our
forces on the enemy, but that General Pemberton opposed it,
until ordered to do so by General J. E. Johnston. This state-
ment is brought forward in defense of General Pemberton, and
as an apology tor the loss of the battle of Baker's Creek. We
then see, in^this assertion, the whole facts of the case laid bare.
The Lieutenant General opposed marching on the enemy. —
Why did he oppose it? Because he was nut aware that the
enemy's rear was exposed to him, must be the natural inference
drawn from his action.

Had our army followed Grant toward Clinton, we would
have compelled him to turn back and give bottle*, which move-
ment would have oxposed his rear to Johnston, and no one
imagines for a moment that Gen. Jos. E. Johnston wonld have
failed to avail himself of the opportunity offered, and attacked
with what force he had. But this was not done ; our army re-
mained on the Big Black in idleness, while the enemy wore
marching on Johnston, and General Pemberton failed to do his
duty, until ordered by General Johnston, in an official dispatch^
which was intercepted by the enemy, who availed themselves ot
its contents, and succeeded in defeating General Pemberton,
after a battle long and gallantly contested, not through any
Generalship on his part, but through the indomitable valor of
our soldiers.

TOE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE BATTLE OF BAKER'S CREEK— MAJOR GENERAL LOR-
ING'S ACTION IN IT-FALSE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.

It lias Leon charged by the friends of General Pemberton,
that but for the unaccountable absence of General Loring's di-
vision, the battle of Baker's Creek would have been won. We
shall now see in what way this charge is true. Major General
Loring's division came into action after Stephenson's division
had lost nearly all its artillery, and as soon as it became engaged
was subject to the same terrible fire as Stephenson's had been ;
at the same time Stephenson's division, after fighting gallantly
for some time without any artillery, was compelled to fall back
from the overpowering numbers of the enemy, thus leaving
Loring's flank exposed. What was then to be done ? If Gen.
Loring had made a stand and continued fighting, it would have
been to have his division cut to pieces and captured, while to
retreat to Vicksburg he knew full well would only hasten the
downfall of the «ity.

With the capture of his artillery, and the breaking of Ste-
phenson's division, the battle of Baker's Creek was irrevocably
lost. This is the opinion of nearly all the ofiicers who were ia
that battle, and from them have we derived ours. Nothing but
the most desperate fighting on the part of General Bo wen's
division, and what of Stephenson's division remained together,
saved our entire army from being captured. The enemy had
already flanked us, and were marching rapidly upon our rear
when he was checked by Bowen, and the army saved.

It was with the knowledge of this fact, that General Loring
decided upon cutting his way through, knowing that he could
better serve the country by so doing, than by being penned up
in Vicksburg, where his division would be only so "much more
to feed. Accordingly his men were all safely drawn off the
battle-field, by one of the most brilliant movements of this war,
and marched to Jackson.

Not the slightest responsibility can be made to rest on Major
General Loring for the loss of the battle of Baker's Creek. So
little was he blamed by the remainder of the Generals and the
other officers, that it was universally believed .that if he had
been in command of our army, the enemy would have been
defeated, and a victory instead of a disaster, been chronicled
for the South in the history of this war. We see nothing that
General Loring performed on that battle-field, which should
make him responsible for its loss, and we believe the same opin-
ion is. held by the officers arid men of the garrison of Vicksburg.
Those parties who are now safe in the Confederate lines, trying
to cast the blame on a ' gallant and tried veteran, should recol-

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUBG

lect that by General Loring's foresight and ability, his division
of several thousand men, instead of being prisoners of war, is
now in Mississippi, standing as a barrier to the advance of the
enemy, and ready, mnder their leader, to fight as well as tney
have always done before.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
OUR WORKS ON THE BIG BLACK RIVER.

After our defeat at Baker's Creek, the Confederate army fell
back to a series of works erected on the east of the Big Black
river and were afterwards driven from them on the day follow-
ing ' It is said that the object of these works was to defend the
bridges across the river, and to prevent Snyder's Bluff from
beinS flanked. We do not believe that such was the idea, but
rather think the intention was to make it a line of delense in
the event of defeat. Before making any comments on what is
generally deemed an error in our choosing this side of the river
as a line of defense, we will endeavor to give a description oi
of the country, and its surrounding Jeat ares, on both sides ot
the Big Black.

The east bank of the river is a level and almost open country,
extending for miles. It is true that it is cut up by creeks, and
a portion of the laud is swampy, but these offered but little
impediment for an army to attack the line of works, which was
thrown up on this side of the river, as was illustrated by the
easy march of the enemy on the intrenchments, and their cap-
ture by them. . .

The icest bank of the river rises to an almost precipitate height,
overlooking the east shore, and forming a succession ot lofty
cliffs. The natural strength of this side offered the greatest
inducements and the best advantages for a line of delense as
we will endeavor to show in our comments on the works that
were erected on the opposite shore. «,,«,. a

As soon as our army was defeated at Baker's Creek, instead
of falling back to the intrenchments on the east shore. of the
river, had they crossed the bridge and burned it after them,
they would then have placed the river between the Confederate
army and the enemy. After crossing, the bluffs could have been
lined with what artillerv remained uncaptured, and the enemy
could never have crossed under the raking fire which would have
been kept up on the opposite shore below them.

By holding this position for two or three days, we would
have been enabled to remove all the provisions from the adjacent
plantations, and taken them into Vicksburg, thus supplying the

78 THE SIEGE OF VICXSBUEG.

garrison with sufficient food to List tliem at least three months
lull rations. It may be said that the enemy could have crossed
the river, either above or below our position, and thus flanked
us'; but it must be apparent that for them to have made such a
move would have taken at least three days, by which time the
object with which the position was held would have been gained,
and our army could then have fallen back to Vicksburg. Had
we succeeded in holding the works erected on the east bank of
the Big Black, our position would have been much worse, as
the enemy could have, with greater ease, crossed the river from
the east to the west than otherwise, and thus have cut us off
from Vicksburg, and also capturing the city without any resis-
tance whatever.

t It has been said by parties desirous of defending Lieutenant
General Pemberton, that it was never his intention to make the
wTorks on the east bank of the Big Black a line of defense ; his
object in attempting to hold the works being only for the pur-
pose of gaining time, to make a safe retreat into Vicksburg. If
such is the case, we quote the opinion of a prominent officer of
the garrison in saying, that the idea was a most absurd one, as
common sense should show that to gain time for our men to fall
back to Vicksburg, a river between them and^the enemy would
have been an aid instead of an obstacle.

With what object then were the works on Big Black erected?
We have seen no official report of General Pemberton, but must
certainly say, that to our limited military experience, the idea of
making a line of defense at that point, or using the works for
the purpose of gaining time for our army to fall back in the
event of defeat, is something new in the annals of this war,
and a species of generalship that no other commander in the
service has yet displayed.

CHAPTER, XXXIX.

THE NEGLECT TO PROVISION VICKSBURG.

The neglect to provision Vicksburg with a supply of food
large enough to supply the garrison for a siege of six months,
is too glaring an error to need much comment on. Suffice it to
say that provisions could easily have been obtained, had those
officials, whose duty it was to procure subsistence, attended to
their business, and not depended solely on what could be found
on the railroads, or impressed from the farmers, who chanced to
be at convenient distances from Vicksburg or Jackson.

While censuring these subordinate officers, we insist that
equal blame must be attached to the Commanding General - ''
the department. It is said that Lieutenant General Pembey/, '

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBUEG.

always believed a large supply of food was s
Vicksliurg, Believed! Let us quote what the I
tions say in relation to the duties of Generals co- f
tified plac tion 818 is worded as follows:

* * :: * * * * "He (referring to the
man lies the worts, and the exterior \?itm.

of attack and investment, the strength of the garn
tillery, the munitions of war, subsistence and siqy} I
J:inds, and takes immediate measures to procure ichu
ficient." •

Vfe shall now ask: in what manner did the Lieutena.
oral commanding the department of Mississippi and East Lou.
iana perform the duties, not left for his judgment to find out,
but actually laid down in the Army Regulations? All asser-
tions that provisions could not be obtained are utterly false ; it
is well known, by all who were in Vicksburg, that numerous
offers were made by the planters on the Mississippi river above
the city, iu the Fall of 1862, when boats were running up the
Yazoo river, to give the Government all their crops, which were
lying exposed to the enemy, if the officials would send for them.
It is also well known that the planters of the Yazoo district of-
fered their crops free of charge, and yet no step was made to
accept the gift so patriotically tendered.

A correspondent of the Richmond Sentinel, in an article de-
fending Lieutenant General Pemberton, claims that it never was
intended to stand a siege of an indefinite length of time. "We
see no reason for this assertion. Sieges have been known to
last for years, and in the same way could Vicksburg have been
held. It is further claimed, that the garrison did not surrender
from want of food, but from weakness. "We now ask : what
caused their weakness? "Was it not the want of food? Had
the men been well supplied with rations, they would have been
almost as strong on the forty-seventh day as they were on the
first. It was, therefore, from starvation, and nothing else, that
they surrendered.

CHAPTER XL.

CONCLUSION.

In concluding this work, we must disclaim having censuied
jreneral Pemberton from any feeling of prejudice against tha*t
officer. Had the Court of Inquiry been held, as it was intend-
ed, this book would never have been published, as the true
unt of the operations in the Department of Mississippi and
Louisiana would have been given to the people, and a book
Uvre would not have been necessary.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

of General Peniberton's inability to meet suc-
it movements, which resulted in the downfall of
-i formed some time before the investment, on
of proper energy in transacting the military
id Vicksburg. This war has developed two
rals. One class is of opinion that positions on
m if well fortified, must always be taken, where
ossess a fleet and control such waters ; while the
ooking back to the history of past warfare, are of
w opinion. Of the former class belong Lieutenant
emberton, as his recommendation to evacuate Charles-
dismantle the fortifications would show ; while in the
,ond class we would place General G. T. Beauregard, who
nas for over three months been successfully defending the very
city that General Pemberton advised evacuating. In making
these remarks, we will not say that General Pemberton believed
attempting the defense of Vicksburg hopeless. We are certain
he did all in his ability for its defense, but that he was incom-
petent to hold the position in which he had been placed. To
use the words of a distinguished General in the Confederate
army, " General Pemberton tried to do his best, but was always
busy doing nothing."

We must beg to disclaim any desire to make this work a por-
tion of the history of this war, in the strict sense of the word.
Our idea has only been to furnish the reader with a narrative of
all that transpired during the two sieges of Vicksburg, and to
do justice to the gallant men who fought, bled, and suffered in
its defense. Many errors and misstatements may be found in
it, but wherever they occur it has been from information obtain-
ed from parties whose high standing in the Confederate army
warrants their publication. If there are any such found, we
shall, with pleasure, after the error is shown and proved to us,
make the necessary amende honorable.

In conclusion, we would say that our censure of General
Pemberton has not been influenced by public opinion, as a proof
of which we would state, that for months past, amid the storm
of charges brought against General Bragg lor incompetency, we
have defended him through the Columns of the press, because,
with the lights before us, he appeared an able and competent
officer. None but the purest motives of conscience and opin-
ion have induced us to chronicle the censure contained within,
and though General Pemberton may, before long, regain the
confidence of the people, and distinguish himself as an officer,
while we would with pleasure record his achievements, we
should always remain of the same opinion — that he exhibited a
great want of competency in his control of the department of
Mississippi and East Louisiana, and particularly in the defense
v of Vicksburg. ^V

the end. * /

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